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Abstract 
This thesis examines the issue ofwelfar~ recipiency. In the first chapter, I develop a 
model designed to capture the fiscal externalities associated with redistributive policy in a 
system of jurisdictions. Previous work in the migration literature ignores work-disincentive 
effects and concludes that relatively generous jurisdictions will attract welfare recipients but 
repel workers. I present a model that integrates migration with labor-leisure choice and I find 
that inclusion of labor-leisure effects unambiguously worsens the fiscal externalities of 
redistribution. In addition, I derive conditions under which an increase in redistribution will 
harm its beneficiaries. 
_____ In_the_s_ec_ond_chapter,J_address_the_issue_o[henefit_harmonization._Within_hothJhe~---­
European Union and the United States, advocates of redistribution have suggested that 
benefits be "harmonized" at levels offered by their most generous members in order to protect 
those members from the fiscal externalities associated with redistribution, and these advocates. 
further suggest that such a harmonization would enhance economic efficiency. The 
economic-efficiency argument is bolstered by traditional work in the public finance literature, 
but the work from which this conclusion is drawn does not account for the work-disincentive 
effects associated with redistributive policy. I find that, when work-disincentive effects are 
considered, the process of benefit harmonization need not improve economic efficiency unless 
the level at which benefits are harmonized is sufficiently low. 
Vll 
The first two chapters found that interstate welfare differentials will induce migration 
and labor-leisure choice. In the third chapter, I provide an empirical examination of the extent 
to which welfare generosity affects welfare recipiency in the United States. I improve on 
previous empirical work in a number of respects: I employ a more .extensive data set, I 
calculate an improved measure of the welfare benefit package, and I use a better estimation 
technique. I find mixed evidence for the importance of welfare generosity: benefit level is 
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In the second chapter of this dissertation, I consider a model that contains both 
migration and labor-leisure choice. I find that the inclusion of labor-leisure choice 
unambiguously increases the absolute number of recipients in the federation (relative to 
traditional work that considers only migration) and thereby decreases the marginal impact of 
additional income-maintenance expenditures on the well-being of the poor. In particular, I 
find that traditional work has understated each of the three primary fiscal externalities 
associated with income maintenance programs: migration is higher, economic efficiency is 
lower and the improvement in the well-being of the poor is lower than would have been 
predicted by traditional analyses. Furthermore, sufficiently severe work-disincentive effects 
imply that a higher income-maintenance level can actually harm the poor. 
In this context, consideration of labor-leisure choice is especially relevant to previous 
theoretical work on redistribution as a public good. When members of society care about the 
poor, economists such as Zeckhauser [1971] and Buchanan [1974] have concluded that 
redistribution to the poor will be underprovided in the absence of government intervention 
because of the free-riding problem. Implicit in this conclusion is the assumption that income-
maintenance increases would help-the poor -- if it is possible for these increases to harm the 
poor, it is impossible to say a priori whether redistribution would be underprovided or 
overprovided (from the point of the view of a recipient) in the absence of government 
intervention. Since labor-leisure choice lessens the marginal impact of redistribution on the 
welfare of the poor, a social planner who attempted to find the "optimal" level of income 
maintenance would overestimate the extent to which government-mandated redistribution 
should be employed. Further, if work-disincentive effects were sufficiently severe, it is 
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possible that a redistribution from recipients to workers would be a Pareto improvement. 
In the third chapter, I examine the issue of benefit harmonization. Within the 
European Union, advocates of redistribution have suggested that income maintenance 
programs be "harmonized" (or at least that a floor be imposed) at the level of its most 
generous states in order to protect those members from the fiscal externalities associated with 
redistributive policy. To the extent that interstate welfare differentials cause high-benefit 
states to attract recipients and repel workers, it is feared that closer European integration will 
impose political pressure on high-benefit states to reduce their income maintenance levels 
[Sinn 1990]. Proponents of redistribution have supported their argument for centralization 
by citing previous work in the economics literature that suggests ·centralization would 
improve economic efficiency. In particular, there is a consensus in the fiscal federalism 
literature that a uniform level of income maintenance across a federation would necessarily 
improve the economic efficiency of that federation because such uniformity would eliminate 
the incentive for welfare-induced migration [Musgrave 1971, Oates 1968]. 
However, the efficiency properties of benefit harmonization are crucially dependent 
on the absence oflabor-leisure effects in the theoretical models of the fiscal federalists. While 
it is true that a uniform income maintenance policy eliminates incentives for welfare-induced 
migration, it does not eliminate the work-disincentive effects of income maintenance 
programs. I examine the traditional framework and conclude that, in the absence ofwork-
disincentive effects, a uniform increase in income maintenance programs will not harm 
economic efficiency. I then add labor-leisure effects to the model and find that, contrary to 
previous work, a uniform increase in income maintenance programs necessarily lowers 
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economic efficiency because it lowers the size of the labor force. Finally, I use these results 
to examine the transition from a system characterized by interstate differentials to a system 
with a uniform income maintenance level and I give conditions under which such a shift would 
raise or lower economic efficiency. In particular, I demonstrate that, for any set ofincome 
maintenance levels in a decentralized federation, there exists a unique uniform income 
maintenance level below which a shift to centralization would unambiguously increase 
economic efficiency. 
This conclusion is important to public policy in both the European Union and the 
United States. With respect to the European Union, it cannot be stated a priori that a shift 
from the status quo to a uniform income maintenance level equal to that of Sweden would 
necessarily increase the economic efficiency of the E.U. - while this might be the case (and 
while such a shift might be desirable because of equity considerations), an increase in 
economic efficiency cannot be guaranteed unless the shift is to British rather than Swedish 
levels. With respect to the United States, where Republicans have argued for decentralized 
redistribution on the ostensible grounds of "states' rights," it cannot be stated a priori that a 
shift from the status quo to decentralization would necessarily increase the economic 
efficiency of the U.S. - while this might be the case (and while such a shift might be desirable 
on other grounds), an iilcrease in economic efficiency cannot be guaranteed unless 
decentralization induces states to lower their income maintenance levels. 
In the second and third chapters, I find that, in a world characterized by a number of 
theoretical assumptions, interstate income maintenance differentials will induce both 
migration and labor-leisure decisions on the part of citizens. With respect to both the welfare 
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of the poor and economic efficiency, the results of these chapters suggest that the public 
policy implications' of previous work may have been overstated. In order for this conclusion 
to have empirical relevance, however, it must be the case that a qualitatively significant 
number of welfare recipients actually make migration and labor-leisure choices in response 
to these interstate differentials. 
In the fourth chapter, I examine the extent to which interstate welfare differentials 
affect welfare recipiency in the United States. While a number of studies have sought to 
examine this issue [Moffit 1992, Cebula 1979], I improve upon these studies in several 
respects. First, past work generally employed extremely limited data sets~ that did not permit 
an analysis ofintertemporal variation. Second, past work considered a smaller portion of the 
total welfare benefit package available to welfare recipients and did not correctly compensate 
for interactive effects between programs. Third, most examples of past work did not use a 
simultaneous-equations system even though welfare recipiency and benefit determination are 
each endogenous to the other. Finally, past work did not consider a number of administrative 
variables that affect both the welfare generosity of a state and the marginal cost of providing 
additional benefits. 
I find mixed evidence on the importance of welfare generosity to welfare recipiency. 
On the one hand, the welfare benefit package exerts an insignificant effect on welfare 
recipiency. On the other hand, several variables related to welfare generosity, including the 
prevalance of welfare offices and the presence of a pregnancy subsidy, exert positive and 
significant effects on welfare recipiency. This finding suggests that the effect of welfare 
generosity on welfare recipiency is more complex than has been noted by previous work, and 
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it provides substantial (though not unambiguous) support for the real-world importance of 
welfare-induced migration and labor-leisure choice. 
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2 Migration and Labor-Leisure Choice in a 
Decentralized Federation 
2.1 Introduction 
When individuals are costlessly mobile across a system of jurisdictions, individuals will 
___ "yote_with_their_feet~and_reside_in_the_jurisdiction_whose_attrihutes_maximize_their_well::heing ____ _ 
[Tiebout 1956]. Economic theory suggests that differential redistributive policies within a 
federation will cause high-benefit jurisdictions to attract recipients and repel workers, and 
recent empirical work has confirmed the responsiveness of migration to redistributive policy 
[Brown and Oates 1987, Gramlich and Laren 1984, Moffitt 1992]. The fiscal externalities 
associated with decentralized redistribution imply that an increase in redistribution by one 
jurisdiction will affect poor individuals in all jurisdictions [Orr 1976]. In particular, previous 
work has concluded that such an increase necessarily helps the poor. 
This consensus is especially important in light of the debate over redistribution as a 
public good. When members of society care about the poor, economists such as Zeckhauser 
[1971] and Buchanan [1974] have concluded that redistribution will be underprovided in the 
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absence of government intervention because of the free-riding problem. That is, although 
each potential contributor values the welfare of the poor, each has an incentive to refrain from 
personal sacrifice because the psychic gains from a single contribution to the poor benefit 
everyone but the monetary costs from a single contribution are borne by the contributor 
alone. In this situation, redistribution becomes a public good, and it is possible for an increase 
in redistribution to be a Pareto improvement [Hochman and Rodgers 1969]. 
The extent to which redistribution helps the poor is crucially dependent on the extent 
to which transfers to the poor generate work-disincentive effects. A number of empirical 
studies suggest that labor-leisure choice has a significant impact on the effectiveness of 
redistributive policies [Parsons 1980, Moffitt 1992]. When individuals may choose between 
leisure and labor, an increase in welfare benefits by one jurisdiction will increase the absolute 
number of poor in a federation as well as induce migration across jurisdictions, thereby 
lessening the marginal impact of redistribution on the true public good: the welfare of the 
poor. In particular, inclusion of work-disincentive effects implies that traditional work has 
understated the fiscal externalities associated with redistribution: migration is higher, 
economic efficiency is lower and the improvement in the well-being of the poor is lower than 
would have been predicted by traditional analyses. Furthermore, sufficiently severe work-
disincentive effects imply that redistribution can harm the poor. When this is the case, 
redistribution becomes (at least at the margin) a public bad rather than a public good, and it 
is possible for a decrease in redistribution to achieve a Pareto improvement in social welfare. 1 
1There is an additional factor that, while ignored by previous work, is relevant to 
discussions of redistribution as a public good: the extent to which altruistic individuals 
value a smaller population of nonworkers as well as a higher income for nonworkers. An 
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The basic framework of the paper is as follows. The second section of the paper 
describes the economic model. The third section examines migratory responses to differential 
levels of redistribution in the context of common markets for labor and amenities when the 
decision to work is exogenous. In this section, we reach the standard conclusions of the 
"fiscal federalists" with an intriguing twist: the observed relationship between benefits and 
wages need not rely on altruism for its explanation. The fourth section extends the basic 
analysis through endogeneity of the labor-leisure decision. In this section, we demonstrate 
that traditional work systematically understates the costs of redistributive policy and 
overstates the benefits. We further show that it is possible for an increase in redistribution 
to harm its beneficiaries. The fifth section gives concluding thoughts. 
2.2 A Description of the Model 
In this paper, we examine redistribution in the context of a system of jurisdictions 
whose citizens migrate in order to maximize utility. Previous work in the migration literature 
has assumed that individuals differ in an exogenously given income parameter, and that these 
individuals migrate in response to differentials in the price of housing [e.g. Epple and Romer 
1991]. A recent paper by Wildasin [1991], however, relaxes the exogenous-income 
assumption with one in which workers receive their marginal products. In the Wildasin 
altruism which valued both of these effects would only strengthen the argument given 
here. 
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framework, a number of jurisdictions share a common labor market within which income-
maximizing individuals receive both welfare benefits and wages. Although this model 
provides a number of empirical insights, it is most appropriate for an analysis oflocal public 
goods because most workers do not receive welfare payments and most recipients do not 
work [Orr 1976]. Thus, an explicit attempt to model welfare benefits requires a different 
formulation. 
When jurisdictions offer differential incomes to costlessly mobile individuals, the 
individuals will migrate until incomes are equalized. 2 In order for jurisdictional incomes to 
equilibrate, income must be congestible in the sense that, for each type of individual, an 
increase in the number of residents lowers jurisdictional income. 3 It is natural for labor 
markets to form the basis of this congestibility when all mobile individuals are employed. In 
a theoretical framework which incorporates both working and nonworking individuals, the 
exclusive use oflabor markets to equilibrate individuals becomes problematic. If the poor do 
not respond to a common labor market, however, to what equilibrating mechanism do they 
respond? 
We assume that both poor and employed individuals respond to market forces in the 
form of locational amenities. It is well known that amenities affect the migration decisions 
2 As Wildasin [ 1992] notes, costless mobility is an increasingly realistic assumption 
due to advances in communications and transportation technology. In general, the 
qualitative conclusions of this paper hold when mobility is costly, although 
interjurisdictional differentials smaller than the cost of mo~ility would persist in 
equilibrium. 
3Ifthis were not the case, the system would equilibrate at a "comer solution" in 
which each type of mobile individual would reside in exactly one jurisdiction. Such a 
system would offer scant theoretical or empirical insight. 
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ofindividuals [Rosen 1979, Graves and Linneman 1979]. In fact, empirical work reveals that 
regional wage differentials are largely a function of amenities [Roback 1982]. A broad range 
of amenities are subject to congestion; examples include beaches, public parks, and even the 
crime rate, which increases with increasing population density.4 Thus, a broadly defined 
measure oflocational amenities satisfies a necessary condition for market equilibrium. 
Although both poor and employed individuals respond to amenity differentials in the 
model, we assume that a poor individual will consume a greater quantity of amenities than an 
employed individual. This assumption need not rest upon any of the observed correlations 
between personal income and deleterious activities such as crime, although these effects 
would only accentuate the conclusions of this paper. We need only assume that individuals 
who work must sacrifice time that would otherwise have been used to consume amenities, or 
that poor individuals are likely to engage in a relatively intense consumption of amenities 
because they lack the money to purchase consumer goods. Without loss of generality, we 
normalize these congestion effects in relation to poor individuals. 
There are two types of individuals in the model, employed and poor, who are 
costlessly mobile across a fixed number of jurisdictions. 5 Each jurisdiction is endowed with 
a Ricardian production function J;(e
1
)for the numeraire commodity, where i is the jurisdiction 
4Although there are noncongestible amenities (such as temperature), we do not 
require that each component of the amenities function be congestible. It is only necessary 
that some portion of the amenities function be congestible, so that the level of amenities is 
downward sloping in population. 
5 Although we assume that all poor and employed individuals are mobile, such 
an assumption is not crucial for the analysis. It should be noted that, when some 
individuals are immobile, the implication of changes in welfare policy may differ 
considerably for mobile and immobile individuals. 
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of interest and e; is the number of individuals who are employed in the jurisdiction. 6 This 
production function is monotonically increasing and concave in the number of employed 
individuals. Each jurisdiction is also endowed with an amenities function a f.P 1+ a e 1), where a 
is a scale factor less than unity and p; is the number of individuals who reside in the 
jurisdiction but are not einpfoyed. 7 The amenities function is, at least at the margin, 
decreasing in its argument. 
Employed individuals are endowed with one unit of labor which must be used to 
produce the numeraire commodity. Each employed individual receives from his employer the 
marginal value oflabor in production of the numeraire, and no resident who is able to work 
may be excluded from employment. Poor individuals, on the other hand, receive subsidies 
from their local jurisdiction instead of wages from an employer. These subsidies are identical 
across all recipients in a given jurisdiction, and no resident who is poor may be excluded from 
the subsidy. Subsidies are provided by landlords, who are assumed to claim all residual 
profits and finance all redistribution; both the landlords and their capital are immobile. 8 
Let the benefit level paid to poor individuals from a given jurisdiction be denoted b;. 
Then the net income of poor individuals in jurisdiction i is given by 
6The production function need not differ across jurisdictions. However, the 
model is completely general with regard to employer human capital and jurisdictional 
technology, both of which could generate interjurisdictional differences in the production 
function. 
7The amenities function, like the production function, need not differ across 
jurisdictions. 
8There is no requirement that residual profits equal redistributive outlays. 
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(1) 
Suppose that the poor seek to maximize net income. Since the poor are costlessly mobile 
across jurisdictions, the equilibrium net income of the poor must be identical across all 
jurisdictions. In other words, 
(2) 
Denote this level of net income by Y. 
Let the wage paid to employed individuals from a given jurisdiction be J;ce 1). Then 
the net income of employed individuals is given by the expression· 
(3) 
Suppose that the employed seek to maximize net income. Since the employed are costlessly 
mobile across jurisdictions, the equilibrium net income of the employed must be identical 
across jurisdictions·. In other words, 
(4) 
Denote this level of net income by ire. 
Finally, let M be the total number of mobile individuals in the system. Since these 
mobile individuals are divided into at most two types, it must be the case that 
(S) 
When the decision to work is exogenous to the model, it is possible to write equations for 




2.3 Comparative Statics and the Wage-Benefit Correlation 
An examination of the traditional framework is instructive both for its confirmation 
of traditional conclusions and its application to an empirical regularity: the wage-benefit 
correlation. There is substantial evidence from the United States that the level of welfare 
benefits provided by a jurisdiction is correlated with the prevailing wage 1n that jurisdiction 
[Orr 1976]. Economists have generally explained this correlation through an appeal to 
altruism tempered by decreasing marginal utility of income [Gramlich and Laren 1984]. 
According to this explanation, a relatively high prevailing wage induces a relatively high 
welfare payment in a jurisdiction. In this section, we investigate the comparative statics of 
the system of jurisdictions and reach a dramatically different explanation for the wage-benefit 
correlation. 
An increase in redistribution by jurisdiction i increases the net income of the poor in 
jurisdiction i. Since such a difference cannot persist in equilibrium, poor individuals must 
migrate from other jurisdictions to jurisdiction i. It is convenient to solve for the migration 
of employed individuals first. To determine the magnitude of this effect, we must first solve 
the system of equations characterized by (2) and (4). A joint implication of these equations 
is that the equilibrium income differential is equalized across jurisdictions. Therefore, 
(6) 
Using this equation, it is possible to solve implicitly for e~yE_yP +b1). The resulting functions 
are simply r 1cyE_yP+b;)'and their derivatives must be negative because wages are decreasing 
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me;. Substituting each labor-demand equation into (Sb), it is possible to solve for the net 
income differential as a function of benefit levels. 
It can be shown by implicit differentiation of ( 5b) that 
. (7) 
This derivative, which we shall denote by the symbol p" measures the marginal impact of a 
change in redistribution on the distribution of income. The migration of employed individuals 
induced by a change in h; is given by 
(8a) 
(8b) 
These equations demonstrate the spillover effect for employed individuals: the equilibrium 
number of employed individuals is unambiguously lower in jurisdiction i and higher in all 
other jurisdictions. 
In a similar manner, once the equilibrium effects on employed individuals are known, 
it is possible to solve for the equilibrium allocation of poor individuals. The change in net 





This derivative, which we shall denote by the symbol x 
1 
measures the marginal impact of a 
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change in redistribution on the net income of the poor. The migration of poor individuals 
induced by a change in b1 is given by 
opt (1 -1 / I 
- • - -n 1)(a1 )-u(l+p 1)e1 > 0 ab, (lOa) 
(lOb) 
These equations demonstrate the spillover effect for poor individuals: the equilibrium number 
of poor individuals is unambiguously higher in jurisdiction i and lower in all other 
jurisdictions. 
,, 
These results permit a discussion of the aggregate effects of a change in b,. A 
unilateral increase in benefits by jurisdiction i induces poor individuals to move from all other 
jurisdictions to jurisdiction i. Since every jurisdiction experiences a change in the number of 
resident poor, every jurisdiction experiences a change in the level of amenities available to 
employed individuals. In particular, the reduced level of amenities in jurisdiction i and the 
increased level of amenities in all other jurisdictions induce migration of employed individuals 
from jurisdiction i into all other jurisdictions. This migration continues until a new 
equilibrium is established. In this new equilibrium, the net income of the poor is 
unambiguously higher, although equation (9) demonstrates that the net income of the poor 
in jurisdiction i cannot increase by the full amount of the benefit increase. 
The presence of a wage-benefit correlation follows directly from the conclusions of 
this section. By equation (6), the benefit level offered by a jurisdiction will be positively 
correlated with the wage in that jurisdiction. However, the wage-benefit correlation is due 
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to market forces rather than altruism. Causation is reversed from the traditional explanation: 
high benefit levels increase the scarcity oflabor by "driving out" employed individuals, and 
it is this decrease in the number of employed individuals that increases the prevailing wage. · 
Thus, the wage-benefit correlation need not rely on altruism for its explanation. 
2.4 Labor-Leisure 
Redistribution 
Effects and Pareto-Optimal 
In the previous section, we have considered a model in which the decision to work is 
exogenous. However, there is reason to believe that the labor-leisure decision is an important 
component of the equilibrium behavior of mobile individuals. Economic theory suggests that, 
by lowering the relative price ofleisure, an increase in redistribution will induce individuals 
to choose leisure over labor, and empirical work has confirmed the existence of this effect 
[Blank 1988, Treyz et al. 1993]. In this section, we investigate the additional implications of 
a benefit increase that occur when the decision to work is endogenous and we discover that 
the severity of spillover effects is unambiguously greater. We further discover that, under 
certain conditions, an increase in welfare benefits unambiguously worsens the welfare of the 
poor. 
Suppose there are a fixed number of mobile individuals, M, who are costlessly mobile 
across types as well as jurisdictions. Let each individual receive some disutility from work, 
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and represent these disutility values by v1.9 Mobile individuals are assumed to compare the 
net income differential between the employed and the poor with their disutility value, and to 
work if and only if the differential exceeds their aversion for work. That is, a given individual 
with disutility value v1 will choose to work if and only if 
(11) 
The number of poor individuals in the system of jurisdictions, P(YE_yP), is given by· an 
examination of (11) for all mobile individuals. 
Suppose that, after iilterjurisdictional migration in response to a benefit increase 
establishes an equilibrium, individuals may choose between labor and leisure. The following 
equations describe the equilibrium changes that would result from an infinitesimal shift from 
labor to leisure: 
aej 
(13) - • '31 < 0 aP 
ayP (1- (£) 
<0 -· (14) ap E (ai1>, 
f}(yE_yP) 1 > 0. 
aP E(e~ 
(15) 
These comparative statics may be employed to obtain the independent effect oflabor-Ieisure 
9Note that the disutility value of an individual need not be a reflection of his 
"work ethic" ifindividuals differ in ways that are irrelevant to the production process but 
relevant in other respects. For example, if a single parent places a relatively high value on 
free time or a member of a minority group faces discrimination in the workplace, these 
individuals are likely to have high disutility values. 
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will be referred to subsequently as the coefficient of leisure because of its relationship to the 
supply of labor. 
The interpretation of these comparative statics yields the result that labor-leisure 
endogeneity worsens spillover effects for all jurisdictions. These effects include an increase 
in the number of poor individuals in each jurisdiction, a decrease in the number of employed 
individuals in each jurisdiction, a decrease in the welfare of the poor, an increase in the wage 
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rate, and an increase in the net income differential between employed and poor. 10 Thus, 
previous work that ignores labor-leisure choice is likely to understate the fiscal externalities 
associated with redistribution and thereby overstate the beneficial effects of redistribution. 
The extent to which previous work understates fiscal externalities is relatively severe when 
the labor demand curve in jurisdiction i is elastic and a large number of _employed individuals 
barely prefer work in the absence of a benefit increase. 
Combining the migration and work-disincentive effects yield the following total 
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1°If workers with high disutility values are concentrated in certain jurisdictions, 
compensatory worker migration into those jurisdictions may be necessary to achieve 
equilibrium. The function P(fE-Y") combines these effects, thereby masking the degree to 
which compensatory migration occurs. However, a separation of the two effects is not 




These comparative statics illustrate the extent to which work-disincentive effects mitigate the 
conclusions of traditional work in the migration literature. In general, fiscal externalities are 
worsened by the inclusion of labor-leisure choice. 
Equation (23) reveals an important implication oflabor-leisure endogeneity: when 
labor-supply effects are sufficiently severe, it is possible for the marginal loss of amenities 
induced by labor-supply changes to exceed the marginal benefit to the poor from the 
additional redistribution. In other words, it is possible for an increase in redistribution by 
jurisdiction i to harm the poor. This phenomenon, which we shall call the New York City 
effect, is difficult to identify through empirical observation because the most easily observable 
components of utility (benefits and wages) are unambiguously higher when the effect occurs. 
The nomenclature for this effect stems from the "paradox" that has been noted by a number 
of New York observers: during the last half-century, both welfare benefits and wages have 
risen dramatically, yet most New Yorkers believe that their standard of living has declined 
[Glazer 1990]. The results of this paper illustrate the economic possibility of such an 
outcome, and also provide an interesting contrast to the results of Hochman and Rodgers 
[1969] and Brennan [1973] on Pareto-optimal redistribution. Taken together, these 
researchers show that there are a variety of circumstances under which an increase in 
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redistribution can benefit everyone. However, a comparison of equations (23) and (25) 
reveals that employed individuals always reap fewer gains from redistribution than the poor. 
Since it is possible for an increase in redistribution to worsen the welfare of the poor, it is 
possible for a reduction in redistribution to be Pareto-improving. 
While this result may appear counterintuitive, it is in many respects similar to recent 
work on congestible facilities. For example, Glazer and Konrad [1993] find that, when poor 
individuals contribute to the congestion of a public facility but rich individuals d.o not, it is 
possible that an income transfer from the poor to the rich would increase the welfare of the 
. ·. 
poor. While the model given here supposes congestion effects by both the poor and the 
employed, the qualitative result of Glazer and Konrad holds because the poor contribute 
disproportionately to the congestion of amenities. When the New York City effect would 
occur, a reduction in benefits is equivalent to a Glazer-Konrad transfer, and such a transfer 
would increase the welfare of the poor. 
The implications of this result actually extend beyond the possibility that redistribution 
can harm its beneficiaries. Zeckhauser [1971] has argued that, when citizens care about the 
welfare of the poor, redistribution will be underprovided in the absence of government 
intervention because of the free-riding problem. While this conclusion provides important 
insights into the nature of redistribution, it need not apply when redistribution would harm 
the poor. Indeed, if Andreoni [1989] and Thurow [1971] are correct in their assertion that 
those who donate to the poor are partially motivated by the act of giving, voluntary transfers 
might occur even when the transfers worsen the welfare of the poor. In this situation, 
voluntary transfers to the poor would be too high rather than too low in the absence of 
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government intervention, and government provision of redistributive benefits might 
exacerbate rather than mitigate the "market failure" associated with redistribution. 
2.5 Conclusion 
In this paper, we have examined the effects of redistributive policy on the welfare of 
its citizens. We have relaxed several common assumptions of the migration literature, 
including fixed wages for employees, fixed marginal effects of redistribution on the welfare 
of the poor, and the absence of labor-leisure choice. We have shown that previous work 
systematically understates the magnitude of redistribution-induced spillovers and overstates 
the extent to which redistribution raises the net income of the ROOr. We have also shown that 
altruism does not cause the wage-benefit correlation and need not imply support for 
redistribution when redistribution induces a portion of the workforce to choose leisure over 
labor. Finally, we have shown that it is possible for a reduction in transfer payments to the 
poor to represent a Pareto improvement in welfare. 
In the model, redistribution is funded by absentee landlords rather than workers. 
While real-world workers undoubtedly contribute to redistributive programs, such a 
contribution would only accentuate the conclusions of this paper. It is of course possible to 
impose a proportional tax on wages, but such a device would contribute scant theoretical 
insight into redistributive policy and would not alter any of the qualitative results. If workers 
in each jurisdiction actually paid for all redistribution within their jurisdictions, workers would 
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face more powerful incentives to move away from concentrations of poor individuals and to 
exit the labor force. Both of these effects would worsen the fiscal externalities associated 
with redistribution. 
From a public policy per~pective, it is important to emphasize what this paper has (and 
has not) shown. We have shown that previous work has overstated the benefits and 
understated the costs of redistribution, which suggests that policymakers may have engaged 
in a superoptimal amount of redistribution. We have also shown that it is possible for an 
increase in redistributive benefits to worsen the welfare of the poor, which suggests that a 
reduction in benefits by one jurisdiction might increase the welfare of all citizens. We have 
not, · however, demonstrated that real-world states ought to reduce their redistributive 
benefits, nor have we demonstrated that any real-world state would actually improve the 
welfare of the poor through a reduction in redistribution. Furthermore, the theoretical results 
of this paper are (like any work of themy) dependent on theoretical assumptions which cannot 
capture the full complexities of real-world economies. For all of these reasons, the results of 
this paper should not be taken as a policy prescription to reduce or eliminate redistributive 
benefits from all real-world federations. It does, however, appear that the magnitude of 
work-disincentive effects is of crucial importance to normative analyses of redistribution, and 




Proof of Result (7): 
Implicitly differentiating (Sa) with respect to h;, we have 
-·--. 
Since E is fixed, 
Rearranging terms, we obtain 
which is the desired result. o 
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Proof of Result (9): 
Implicitly differentiating ( 5) with respect to b; yields 
a(P+ 11E) a,E aj/ 
ab, ab, 
Since P, 11 and E are fixed, 
ab, 
~ -1 " -1} • a a, + .l..Jkf.t at 
Therefore, it must be the case that 
which proves the result. D 
Proof of Result (16): 
ab, 
ayP 
" -1 .l..Jkf.t at 
Let w· be the change in ( fE-Y') that occurs as a result of the influx of new poor. 
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Since 
and the change in (yE'-1'1') that results from interjurisdictional migration is p,, it must be the 
case that 




The change in P is given by 
Therefore, we have 
aP ------
which is the desired result. D 
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3 Benefit Harmonization a·nd Economic 
Efficiency: Lessons for the European Union 
3.1 Introduction 
Within the European Union, advocates of redistribution have suggested that benefits 
be "hannonized" (or at least that a floor be imposed) at the level ofits most generous states 
---in-order-to-protect-those-members-from-the-fiscal-externalities-associated-with-redistribution. 
To the extent that interstate welfare differential cause high-benefit states to attract recipients 
and repel workers, it appears likely that a "common market" in Europe would yield greater 
benefits to nations with low levels of redistribution; worse, it is feared that these pressures 
would encourage the more "progressive" members of the EU to lower their benefits [Sinn 
1990]. To a European Union whose leaders support high levels of redistribution, such 
pressures are anathema. 1 
Traditional economic analysis suggests that redistribution should be performed by a 
central government rather than by decentralized jurisdictions. Economists such as Musgrave 
1 As Emerson [ 1991] notes, collective arrangements such as the Social Charter 
have been designed by EU leaders to mitigate these competitive pressures. 
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[1971] and Oates [1968] have noted that a central government could impose equal levels of 
redistribution across all jurisdictions, thereby eliminating the interjurisdictional differential that 
induce migration. in effect, centralized redistribution· can transform a system of jurisdictions 
into a single jurisdiction from which mobile individuals cannot escape. Advocates of benefit 
harmonization have concluded from this finding that benefit harmonization will not produce 
economic inefficiencies regardless of the level at which benefits are harmonized. 
The efficiency properties of centralized redistribution are critically dependent on the 
absence of any labor-supply effects of redistributive policy. Previous work in the migration 
literature is virtually silent on the subject of labor-leisure choice, although a substantial 
amount of empirical evidence suggests that work-disincentive effects are relevant in 
employment decisions [Parsons 1980, Moffitt 1992]. Endogeneity of the labor-leisure 
decision can have significant effects on equilibrium outcomes ·because an increase in welfare 
benefits by one jurisdictions might increase the absolute number of poor as well as induce 
migration across jurisdictions. Even a central government is vulnerable to these effects; 
although workers/recipients cannot escape a central government's redistributive policy 
through migration, it is possible for them to choose leisure over labor. For this reason, 
endogeneity of the labor-leisure decision permits an analysis of redistributive externalities that 
traditional analyses fail to capture. 
The paper is organized as follows. The second section of the paper describes the basic 
model. The third section examines migratory responses to differential levels of redistribution 
in the context of common markets for labor and amenities when the decision to work is 
exogenous. In this section, we confirm the traditional result that uniform changes in 
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redistributive policy do not produce fiscal externalities. The fourth section extends the basic 
analysis to incorporate the work-disincentive effects of redistributive policy. In this section, 
we demonstrate that uniform changes in redistribution are not sufficient to achieve economic 
efficiency because such changes affect the output of the federation. The fifth section applies 
the analysis to a transition from decentralization to centralization. In this section, we show 
that a move from decentralization to centralization need not enhance economic efficiency. 
We also define a centralized equivalent to any decentralized set ofbenefits and give conditions 
under which movement from decentralization to centralization increases or decreases 
economic efficiency. The final section gives concluding thoughts. In this section, we apply 
the conclusions of the paper to the European Union. 
3.2 The Theoretical Framework 
This chapter examines the extent to which centralized redistribution enhances 
economic efficiency. There are two types of individuals in the theoretical framework, 
employed and poor, who are costlessly mobile across a fixed number of jurisdictions that 
belong to a federation. 2 There are also two types of government, jurisdictional and central, 
2 Although we assume that all poor and employed individuals are mobile, such an 
assumption is not crucial for the analysis. It should be noted that, when some individuals 
are immobile, the implication of changes in welfare policy may differ considerably for 
mobile and immobile individuals. 
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each of which is empowered to offer subsidies to unemployed individuals.3 Each jurisdiction 
is endowed with a Ricardian production function J;(e,)for the numeraire commodity, where 
i is the jurisdiction of interest and e; is the number of individuals who are employed in the 
jurisdiction. 4 This production function is monotonically increasing and concave in the number 
of employed individuals. Each jurisdiction is also endowed with an amenities function 
af.p 1+a.e1), where a. is a scale factor less than or equal to unity and p; is the number of 
individuals who reside in the jurisdiction but are not employed. The amenities function is, at 
least at the margin, decreasing iii its argument. s 
Employed individuals are endowed with one unit of labor which must be used to 
produce the numeraire commodity. Each employed individual receives from his· employer the 
marginal value of labor in production of the numeraire, and no resident who is able to work 
----.may-be-excluded-from-employment-;-T-he-tax-burden-borne-by-each-employed-individual-is----~ 
given by the sum' of a federal wage tax, which is identical across jurisdictions, and a 
jurisdictional wage tax that can differ across jurisdictions. The rate at which these taxes are 
assessed is invariant to changes in redistributive policy, although aggregate revenue from 
taxation will vary because policy changes affect the wage rate. Formally, the net income of 
3This formulation permits an analysis of benefit floors as well as benefit 
harmonization. Since harmonization is a special case in which all jurisdictional benefits are 
equal, conclusions under the more general framework apply to analyses of harmonization. 
4The production function need not differ across jurisdictions. However, the model 
is completely general with regard to employer human capital and jurisdictional technology, 
both of which could generate interjurisdictional differences in the production function. 
5The importance of amenities in the migration decision is demonstrated by Rosen 
[1979] and Roback [1982]. 
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employed individuals in jurisdiction i is given by 
Y1E • [1-t 
1-t '1(,(e1) + a/,P1+ a.e1) (I) 
where f denotes the jurisdictional (state) tax, f' denotes the federal (national) tax andf;'(eJ 
denotes the marginal productivity of.labor. Hereafter, we shall for the sake of expositional 
simplicity subsume (except where explicitly noted) the tax coefficients into the wage 
expression. 
Poor individuals choose to surrender their endowment of labor in exchange for 
subsidies from their local jurisdiction and the federal government. Local subsidies are 
identical across all recipients in a given jurisdiction~ no unemployed resident of a jurisdiction 
may be excluded from its subsidy and no jurisdiction may offer subsidies to residents of any 
other jurisdiction. The federal subsidy is identical across all unemployed individuals in the 
federation, and no unemployed individual may be excluded from this subsidy. The poor pay 
no taxes; any budget shortfall is financed by immobile factory owners, who are assumed to 
claim the profits of the production process. Formally, the net income of poor individuals in 
jurisdiction i is given by 
rt. b, + g + af.p,+a.e,) (2) 
where b; is the jurisdictional subsidy and g is the federal subsidy. 
Since employed individuals are costlessly mobile, it must be the case that 
/i(e 1) + af.P1+a.e1). Jj(e} + aJ(p1+a.e1) \::/ ij. (3) 
The set of equations given by (3) gives the net income of an employed individual in any 
jurisdiction, which we shall denote by P. Similarly, it must be the case that 
(4) 
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This set of equations gives the net income of a poor individual in any jurisdictiction, which 
we shall denote by fP. 
Finally, let M be the total number of mobile individuals in the system. Since these 
mobile individuals are divided into at most two types, it must be the case that 
L P1+:E et· M. (S) 
When the decision to work is exogenous to the model, it is possible to write equations for 
each type of individual: 
LPt. p 
L e1 • E. 
3.3 Traditional Results 
(Sa) 
(Sb) 
In the traditional framework, rent-seeking behavior by individuals in response to 
benefit differentials causes externalities that hinder the ability of any single jurisdiction to 
increase the welfare ofits poor. In this section, we confirm the traditional result that a change 
in redistributive policy by a single jurisdiction will always generate fiscal externalities. We 
also show that a uniform change in redistributive policy across all jurisdictions will never 
generate such externalities. 
When jurisdiction; chooses to increase its subsidy to the poor, the net income of the 
poor in jurisdiction ; rises above that of the poor in other jurisdictions. Since such a 
difference cannot persist in equilibrium, poor individuals must migrate from other jurisdictions 
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to jurisdiction i. However, this migration will affect the level of amenities offered by each 
jurisdiction, which will in tum induce migration by employed individuals. Equations (3) and 
( 4) jointly imply that the equilibrium income differential between the employed and the poor 
will be equalized across jurisdictions; that is, 
(6) 
Using this equation, iLis possible to solve implicitly for etYE_yP.b1+g). The resulting 
functions are simply r 1cyE_yP+b 1+g)'and their derivatives must be negative because wages are 
decreasing in the number of employed individuals. 
An examination of the employment functions derived from (6) reveals that, by 
application of the chain rule, the sign of their derivatives cannot be determined without an 
ex~unination of the derivative of G':_-fl'l with resQect to a change in bi. lmQlic~t differentiation 
of(Sb) reveals that the change in the distribution of income resulting from a small change in 
the jurisdictional benefit level is given by 
(7) 
This derivative, which we shall denote by the symbol p 
1
, is always positive and always less 




and the spillover effect for employed individuals is unambiguous: a jurisdiction that chooses 
to increase its subsidy will lose workers and cause every other jurisdiction to gain workers. 
In a similar manner, once the equilibrium effects on employed individuals are known, · 
it is possible to solve for the equilibrium allocation of poor individuals. The change in net 
income for poor individuals resulting from a small change in the jurisdictional subsidy is given 
by 
(a1-1Y 
--.--- > 0, 
E <ai1), (9) 
and we shall denote this derivative by the symbol 11: 1. The migration of poor individuals 
induced by a change in b; is therefore 
(IOa) 
(lOb) 
and the spillover effect for poor individuals is similarly unambiguous: a jurisdiction that 
choose to increase its subsidy will gain poor individuals and cause every other jurisdiction to 
lose poor individuals. 
These results contrast sharply with those that result from an increase m the 
systemwide subsidy, g. The relevant changes in net income become 
(11) 




These results, when inserted into equations (8) and (10), reveal that neither employed nor 
poor individuals choose to migr:ate in response to the increase in g. Thus, uniform changes 
in redistributive policy will not (in the absence of labor-leisure choice) generate fiscal 
externalities. 
3.4: How Work-Disincentive Effects Alter Traditional 
Conclusions 
Economic theory suggests that an increase in redistribution will induce individuals to 
choose leisure over labor (provided leisure is a normal good) because sucliaifincrermdowers----__________, 
the relative price of leisure. A significant amount ·of empirical work suggests that subsidies 
to unemployed individuals produce work-disincentive effects [Moffitt 1992, Blank 1988]. 
We have already shown that, in the absence of work-disincentive effects, uniform changes in 
redistributive policy do not impede economic efficiency. In this section, we demonstrate that 
this conclusion does not hold when individuals are free to choose between leisure and labor. 
In particular, work-disincentive effects guarantee that changes redistributive policy will 
change the size of the labor force and thereby affect economic efficiency. 
In order to introduce work-disincentive effects into the model, suppose that each 
mobile individual receives some disutility from work. These disutility values may (but need 
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not) reflect the underlying "work ethic" of each individual.6 In choosing between leisure and 
labor, each individual will compare his disutility value with the marginal benefit from 
employment and will choose to work if and only if the marginal benefit exceeds his disutility 
value. That is, a given individual with disutility value v will choose to work if and only if 
yE_yP > 'VI. (13) 
The number of poor individuals in the system of jurisdictions, P(Y E -Y P>, is given by an 
examination of (13) for all mobile individuals. 
Consider a change in redistributive policy by either the federal government or a single 
jurisdiction. We suppose that, once interjurisdictional migration establishes an equilibrium, 
individuals are free to choose between leisure and labor and then migrate in response to those 
choices. 7 Two separate effects are relevant to the analysis: the equilibrium changes that 
would result from an infinitesimal shift from labor to leisure (common to either a jurisdictional 
or a uniform shift in.redistributive policy) and the magnitude of the labor-.leisure effect. The 
changes with respect to a small change in the number of unemployed indi"'.iduals are 
(14) 
6The disutility value of an individual might also reflect traits that are irrelevant to 
the production process but relevant in other respects. For example, a single parent might 
place a relatively high value on "leisure" in order to care for her children, and a member of 
a minority group might place a relatively low value on "labor" ifhe would suffer 
discrimination in the workplace. 
7This assumption facilitates the independent analysis oflabor.,.leisure effects and 
does not entail any loss of generality. 
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(15) 
ayP --ap (16) 
1 > 0 
L (e~ (17) 
and the magnitude of the labor-leisure _effect is given by 
ap e~' 




aP P' > aP > o. 
og P'-Le~ ab1 
(19) 
Application of the chain rule to these equations demonstrates that work-disincentive 
effects unambiguously worsen the spillover effects of the previous section. In particular, the 
number of unemployed individuals is unambiguously higher (and the size ofthe workforce 
unambiguously lower) than would have been predicted by the traditional framework. Thus, 
previous work that ignores labor-leisure choice suffers from a systematic bias that lessens the 
efficiency-impeding effects of redistribution. The extent to which previous work understates 
the fiscal externalities associated with redistribution is especially severe when a substantial 
portion of the workforce is almost indifferent between leisure and labor before the change in 
redistributive policy. 
The comparative statics of this section reveal that work-disincentive effects will in 
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general occur whenever either the entire federation or a single jurisdiction adjusts its 
redistributive policy. However, a comparison of equations (18) and (19) demonstrates that 
the work-disincentive effects induced by a change in redistributive policy are unambiguously 
greater when the change occurs across all jurisdictions. This need not imply that the total 
externalities associated with policy changes will be greater under a uniform increase in 
redistribution, though it does illustrate the importance of labor-leisure choice in models of 
redistribution. Changes in a benefit floor or changes in a harmonized benefit level will 
generate externalities despite the fact that these changes do not create interjurisdictional 
differentials, and it is in fact possible for these externalities to exceed those of decentralized 
redistribution. 
3.5 Benefit Harmonization and Out(!ut Maximization 
Perhaps the most common policy prescription in the fiscal federalism literature is for 
a central government to impose a uniform level of redistribution across jurisdictions 
[Peterson and Rom 1990]. In general, previous work has concluded that centralized 
redistribution eliminates spillovers and induces economic efficiency [Buchanan 1950, Wildasin 
1991]. 8 Advocates of redistribution have used these conclusions to argue both for 
centralization and for increased subsidies to the poor [Sinn 1990]. However, we have shown 
8ln this paper, "centralized redistribution" is equivalent to the presence of a 
common benefit level across jurisdictions. Thus, the analysis applies to both coordinated 
and centralized redistribution. 
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that the inclusion of labor-leisure choice eliminates the optimality properties of centralized 
redistribution. In particular, when mobile individuals may choose between labor and leisure, 
a simultaneous increase in benefits to the poor will affect economic efficiency even though 
traditional analyses predict otherwise. 
The presence of spillovers under centralized redistribution illustrates the inadequacy 
of traditional concepts of economic efficiency in the migration literature as applied to 
redistribution. In brief, traditional work in the migration literature postulates that economic 
efficiency is achieved when the marginal product of each factor is equalized across 
jurisdictions. When workers are the sole factor of production and receive their marginal 
product, optimal factor allocation implies that wages must be equalized across jurisdictions. 
Since differential welfare benefits distort the locational decisions of workers, optimal factor 
allocation also implies that benefit levels be equalized across jurisdictions. Thus, economic 
efficiency is achieved whenever each jurisdiction offers the same redistributive policy. 
With the inclusion of labor-leisure choice, marginal factor product equalization no 
longer suffices to guarantee economic efficiency. In the framework of this paper, marginal 
factor product equalization implies amenity level equalization, which in tum implies benefit 
level equalization. Therefore, identical redistributive policies across jurisdictions is a 
necessary and sufficient condition the equalization of marginal factor products. However, 
identical policies cannot guarantee economic efficiency because the level at which the subsidy 
to poor individuals is set affects the supply of labor and hence national output. It is useful to 
label the equalization of marginal factor products as a/locative efficiency in order to 
distinguish factor product equalization from the broader issue of output maximization. 
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Consider a federation in which subsidies (and tax rates) have been harmonized. We 
have shown that any such federation satisfies allocative efficiency, so there is no alternative 
spatial distribution of labor that would increase national output. However, the size of the 
labor force is related to the level at which subsidies are harmonized: relatively high subsidies 
will induce a relatively high number of individuals tQ choose leisure over labor and relatively 
low subsidies will induce a relatively high number of individuals to choose labor over leisure. 
The highest level of national output is therefore achieved when all jurisdictions refrain from 
redistribution. As long as every i~dividual has a finite disutility value, there is also some level 
of redistribution above which the lowest level of national output (zero) is achieved. 
Now, consider a federation in which subsidies (but not tax rates) differ across 
jurisdictions. Since it is possible to obtain any feasible amount of national output through a 
uniform subsidy, any vector of (nonharmonized) jurisdictional subsidies b* for which national 
output is positive has a centralized equivalent, g*, which would produce equal national 
output. Furthermore, the size of the labor force will always be smaller under g* than under 
b* because g* satisfies allocative efficiency. Thus, a transition from b* to any uniform benefit 
level less than g* would increase economic efficiency and a transition from b * to any uniform 
benefit level greater than g* would decrease economic efficiency. 
The centralized equivalent describes the set of uniform benefit levels under which a 
transition from decentralization to benefit harmonization would increase economic efficiency. 
While it would be desirable to determine the magnitude of the centralized equivalent relative 
to (for example) the median benefit offered by its decentralized counterpart, it is not in 
general possible to determine such a result. However, it is possible to compare the 
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equilibrium induced by a set of differential benefits and a harmonized equilibrium whose 
benefit level is equal to the minimum pre-harmonization benefit. Denote the set of differential 
benefits by b * and the minimum pre-harmonization benefit by bMIN· If it can be shown that 
a benefit increase by any single jurisdiction necessarily reduces the size of the labor force, it 
must be the case that a system of jurisdictions that offers a benefit vector b * would increase 
its output by undergoing a "downward harmonization" to the level offered by the least 
generous member of the federation. Similarly, such a finding would demonstrate that an 
"upward harmonization" to the level offered by the most generous member of the federation 
must reduce its output. 





summarizes the labor-supply effects of redistributive policy and is an increasing function of 
labor supply elasticity. Summing equations (20a) and (20b) over all jurisdictions, we obtain 
the number of individuals who exit the labor force as a response to the change in benefits, 
(21) 
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Equation (21) demonstrates that a more generous redistributive policy by a single jurisdiction 
unambiguously decreases the size of the labor force within the federation. Since each element 
of the vector b* is greater than or equal to the corresponding element of the vector bMIN• the 
labor force of the federation is necessarily smaller under b* than under bMIN• and since bMIN 
satisfies allocative efficiency, economic efficiency is unambiguously greater under bMIN than 
b*. 
These results raise substantial doubts about the wisdom of benefit harmonization in 
the European Union. It has be~n proposed that benefits among the member states of the 
European Union be harmonized at the level ofits most generous member, and a number of 
economists have contended that such an "upward harmonization" would not harm economic 
efficiency. However, we have shown that there exists some harmonized benefit level above 
which the transition to harmonization will unambiguously harm economic efficiency, which 
suggests the possibility that the efficiency gains associated with an upward harmonization 
have been overstated. Furthermore, although the economic ramifications of an upward 
.harmonization are open to question, we have shown that a "downward harmonization" of 
redistributive policies to those of the least generous member of the federation would 
unambiguously increase the economic efficiency of the federation. This conclusion does not 
by itself imply that the European Union should engage in such a harmonization. However, 
it does suggest that the case for an upward harmonization rests with fairness rather than with 
economic efficiency. 
· 3.6 Conclusion 
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In this paper, we have examined the effects of redistributive policy on the welfare of 
its citizens. We have relaxed several common assumptions of the migration literature, 
including fixed wages for employees,·fixed marginal effects of redistribution on the welfare 
' . 
of the poor, and the absence oflabor-leisure choice. We have shown that previous work 
which touted the efficiency-enhancing properties of centralization is crucially dependent on 
an absence of work-disincentive effec.ts. When these effects are included, previous work 
systematically understates the ~agnitude of redistribution-induced spillovers. Moreover, 
optimal economic efficiency occurs when and only when all jurisdictions refrain from 
redistribution, and a transition from sep.arate jurisdictional benefit policies to a single federal 
policy will not enhance economic efficiency unless the level at which benefits are harmonized 
is sufficiently low. 
It should be noted that real-world governments do not (and should not) have 
economic efficiency as their only objective. For example, it is possible for political 
preferences to favor (de)centralization whether or not it promotes economic efficiency, as the 
Soviet Union and Slovakia have demonstrated. It is also possible that different levels of 
government might possess (dis)economies of scale with respect to the redistribution function, 
so that (de )centralization of the redistribution function might by itself affect the provision of 
redistributive benefits. Finally, there might be reason to believe that political actors will be 
less vulnerable to political pressure under a (de )centralized system of government, and this 
belief might affect whether redistribut~ve decisions should be made by (for example) an 
unelected European Commission at the federal level or elected parliaments of federation 
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members. However, economic efficiency must play a role in the determination of public 
policy, and the results of this paper are unambiguous: previous work has overstated the 
efficiency-enhancing properties of uniform benefit policies. 
The main conclusions of this paper bear directly on the question of benefit 
harmonization in the European Union. In particular, while members of the European 
Commission argue that benefit harmonization at a generous level would enhance economic 
efficiency, the analysis given in this paper demonstrates that such a conclusion is at best 
unwarranted and at worse erroneous. Indeed, efficiency gains can only be guaranteed when 
benefits are harmonized at the least generous level of the federation. Thus, while equity may 
demand a harmonization that extends generous benefits across every member of the European 
Union, it is quite possible that the fiscal externalities generated by such a harmonization would 
lower the economic efficiency of the EU. 
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Appendix 
Proof of Result (7): 
Implicitly differentiating (Sa) with respect to bi, we have 
Since Eis fixed and ei is a function of the quantity (YE_ yP +bi+ g), it must be the case that 
Rearranging terms, we obtain 
which is the desired result. o 
47 
Proof of Result (9): 
implicit differentiation of ( 5) with respect to bi reveals that 
""" -1 8(P + uE) u L.J ,_.A: 
ab, ab, 
Since P, E and a are fixed, it must be the case that 
Rearranging terms yields 
which proves the result. D 
Proof of Result (11): 
-1' a, 
• 'lt t 
"" -1' L.J ak 
By definition, E = I,ei.(YE_ yP +bk +g). Differentiating this equation with respect to a 
change in the federal government subsidy, g, we obtain 
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Since Eis fixed, its partial derivative with respect tog must be zero. Therefore, 
which is the desired result. D 
Proof of Result (12): 
From equation (2), Pi +aei = B-j"1(YP-bi -g). Therefore, 
Differentiating both sides with respect to g, 
8[P+aE] • L (a;l){ayP _ l] . 
ag ag 
Since both P and E are constant, 
A rearrangement of terms yields 
which is the desired result. D 
Proof of Result (18): 
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fJYP • L (ail)' • 1 
ag L (ail>' 




and the change in (~-Y1') that results from interjurisdictional migration is p,. it must be the 
case that 
-WE e~--P '(P ,- W) 
in equilibrium. This equation may be simplified to 
which may be further simplified to 
w. Pf' 
P'+L e~ 
The change in P is given by 
Therefore, we have 
which is the desired result. D 
so 
aP • -P'(PcW) 
ab, 
• -P { p tL e ~ l · 
P'+ Le~ 
ap 'p' e, ------
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4 Do Interstate Welfare Differentials Aff ecf 
Welfare Recipiency? 
4.1 Introduction 
The recent Republican takeover of Congress has brought renewed emphasis to the 
issue of welfare policy. Republican leaders argue that a decentralized welfare system will 
improve the economic efficiency of the United States and permit states to select policies that 
are favored by their own citizens rather than the nation as a whole. Opponents of the 
Republican agenda argue that a decentralized system will harm economic efficiency and 
encourage states to reduce the generosity of their welfare programs. 
Previous chapters of this dissertation argue that benefit differentials across states will 
induce welfare migration and labor-leisure choice. There are two important implications to 
this conclusion. First, increased decentralization of welfare policy need not promote 
economic efficiency, although it is possible for U.S. economic efficiency to rise if states are 
sufficiently stingy under a decentralized system. Second, high-benefit states will be penalized 
(and low-benefit states rewarded) for their welfare benefit policies. These two implications 
suggest, to liberals and conservatives alike, that a truly decentralized welfare system will 
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create political and economic pressures whose end result will be a dramatic reduction in 
welfare benefits for the poor. 
In order for this conclusion to have empirical relevance, it must be the case that a 
significant number of welfare recipients make migration and labor-leisure choices in response 
to interstate welfare benefit differentials. The primary purpose of this study is to examine the 
extent to which welfare differentials across states affect state welfare recipiency. Toward this 
end, I have compiled an extensive data set and calculated an improved measure of the benefit 
package available to welfare recipients. I also use an improved estimation technique and I 
suggest new interpretations for a number of variables. In addition, I consider several welfare-
related administrative variables that have been ignored by past research into welfare 
rec1p1ency. 
The paper is organized as follows. In the second section, I give a brief review of the 
literature and I discuss the respects in which I improve upon the literature. In the third 
section, I present background information on the three major welfare programs for able-
bodied adults in the United States. In the fourth section, I discuss the conceptual and data-
collection difficulties that complicate benefit-package calculations. In the fifth section, I 
discuss the extent to which interstate welfare differentials exist across states and over time. 
In the sixth and seventh sections, I outline the two equations that compose the 
recipient/benefit-setting model of this paper. The eighth section discusses the estimation 
technique and details the precise equations to be estimated. The ninth and tenth sections 
present the statistical results and give concluding thoughts. 
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4.2 A Brief Review of the Literature 
In recent years, empirical researchers have examined a number of issues that are 
related to welfare benefit packages. Ellwood and Bane [1986] and Moffitt [1990] examine 
marital-status effects and conclude that the provision of welfare benefits to unmarried mothers 
reduces the likelihood that those mothers will marry and that the magnitude of this effect has 
been rising over time, although the studies find no evidence that out-of-wedlock births are 
induced by welfare programs. Gottschalk [1990, 1992] examines the intergenerational 
transmission ofw.elfare recipiency and concludes that parental welfare receipt.increases the 
probability of welfare receipt among children. Moffitt [ 1981] examines the issue of welfare 
stigma and concludes that, while there is some evidence to suggest that stig._m_a_d_e_te_r_s ____ . 
individuals from applying for welfare, society became much less intolerant of welfare 
recipiency during the 1960s and that this intolerance continued to fall in later years. Other 
studies have examined such topics as welfare exits [Piskulich 1993], cost-of-living 
differentials [Cebula 1979] and the share of state spending devoted to welfare programs 
[Tresch 1976]. 
A number of studies have examined welfare recipiency in the United States. While 
the findings of past work are mixed [Cebula 1979b, Danziger et al. 1981 ], more recent work 
is remarkably consistent in its contention that welfare benefits exert small but significant 
effects on migration, labor-leisure choice and welfare receipt [Moffitt 1992]. Cebula [1981] 
and Cebula and Koch [ 1989] examine one year of state data using ordinary least squares and 
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find that interstate migration is significantly related to the AFDC benefit level offered by a 
state. These results are verified by Cloutier and Loviscek [1989] for metropolitan areas and 
by Cebula [ 1991] for the state of Wisconsin. Blank [ 1985] examines labor-leisure choice and 
finds that welfare participation rates are influenced by the wages and benefits offered by a 
state. Micro-level analyses by Gramlich and Laren [1984] and Blank [1988] confirm the 
(small but significant) impact of AFDC levels on migration and labor-leisure choice. Finally, 
Peterson and Rom [1989] extend both the data (to three time periods) and the statistical 
methodology (to two-stage least squares) and find that state poverty rates are related to a 
measure of the AFDC/Food Stamps package. 
Somewhat surprisingly, relatively few studies have directly examined benefit 
determination across states in the United States. Spall [1978] examines one year of state data 
using ordinary least squares and finds that state AFDC benefits are positively related to per 
capita income and negatively related to the proportion of state residents who receive benefits. 
Cebula [1981] also examines one year of state data using ordinary least squares and finds that 
AFDC benefits are positively related to the proportion of state residents who receive benefits 
and positively related to state unemployment. Orr [1976] and Gramlich [1982] examine a 
decade of state data and finds that AFDC benefits and the AFDC/Food Stamps package, 
respectively, are positively related to both per capita income and the federal matching rate. 
Finally, Peterson and Rom [1989] examine three years of state data using two-stage least 
squares and find that a measure of the AFDC/Food Stamps package is negatively related to 
the poverty rate of a state and positively related to the taxes levied by a state. While these 
studies reach somewhat different conclusions about the factors that influence benefit rate 
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determination, each finds some evidence that state welfare benefit packages are affected by 
politics. 
I employ a data set that contains annual observations for the 1979-1991 interval. The 
thirteen years of this analysis far exceed those of previous work, which was generally limited 
to cross-sectional analysis and almost never exceeds three time periods. In general, data-
collection difficulties are responsible for these limited data sets; much of the necessary data 
for a more extensive analysis are not readily available or are not published in a format that is 
conducive to computer analysis. Despite the difficulty of obtaining data, it is available for 
those who exert a sufficient amm1nt of time and effort on data collection, and there are at 
least two reasons why it is useful to collect this data. First, the additional observations 
afforded by a larger panel data set should increase the efficiency of the coefficient estimates. 
Second, and most importantly, an extensive panel data set permits an analysis of both 
intertemporal and cross-sectional variation. 
I also employ a more comprehensive measure of the welfare benefit package and I 
employ a more rigorous calculation method for the elements of that package. Two-thirds of 
the articles in this literature review, for example, use AFDC alone as a proxy for the welfare 
benefit package even though both Food Stamps and Medicaid provide substantial benefits to 
the poor. Most of the remaining articles use the AFDC-Food Stamps combination as a proxy 
for the package, but these articles do not consider the full set of Food Stamp regulations that 
affect the combination of the programs, which means that they use an incorrect estimate of 
the AFDC-Food Stamps package. Virtually none of the articles consider Medicaid, and those 
that do are hampered by an inability to distinguish between able-bodied users and the senior 
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citizen population, which introduces a severe upward bias into Medicaid use estimates. I 
consider each of these effects and calculate an improved welfare benefit package measure that 
incorporates AFDC, Food Stamps and Medicaid. 
4.3 Welfare Programs in the United States 
· Before discussing the calculation of the welfare benefit package, it is useful to present 
some background information on the major welfare programs in the United States. There are 
three such programs available to able-bodied non-elderly individuals: Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children, Food Stamps and Medicaid. In this section, I discuss each of these 
programs. 
4.3.1 Aid to Families with Dependent Children 
Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) is the largest welfare program in 
the United States that gives cash payments to able-bodied individuals under 65 years of age. 
It was established by Title IV of the Social Security Act of 193 5 "for the purpose of 
maintaining and strengthening family life by providing financial assistance and care to needy 
dependent children" [USDHSS OF A 1985]. While the initial legislation forbade payments to 
single mothers for their own use (rather than for the care of children), 1950 amendments to 
the SSA reversed this prohibition. By the early 1970s, the program had evolved into its 
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current form as an assistance program for all single-parent families who are sufficiently poor. 
AFDC programs are formulated by states and approved for use by the federal 
government. In order to achieve federal approval, the Social Security Act sets certain· 
guidelines which states are required to follow. First, everyone who is eligible for the program 
must have a reasonable opportunity to apply for the program. Second, administrative 
decisions regarding eligibility must be made.within a reasonable period of time and no later 
than 45 days after receipt of application. Third, individuals whose requests for aid are denied 
must be given the opportunity for a fair hearing regarding the denial. Finally, individuals who 
have similar circumstances must receive equal treatment under the program. 
Apart from the broad guidelines given under the Social Security Act, states have a 
remarkable amount of freedom in constructing their AFDC programs. Each state may set its 
own level of "need" for families with dependent children. While this level is supposed to 
reflect economic realities, states are not compelled to adjust their standards to correspond 
with living costs and few have done so. Furthermore, each state may set the amount of 
"need" that it will actually pay to program participants, and this payment need not reflect 
costs of living. 
AFDC assistance payments are funded by states and by the federal government 
according to two different formulae under which, in general, states with lower levels of gross 
state product receive a higher matching rate from the federal government. The federal 
government matching rate is never less than fifty percent and has been as high as eighty 
percent. Administrative costs are also matched by the federal government, but at a constant 
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rate of fifty percent. States may require localities to pay a portion of the state share for either 
assistance or administration. 
4.3.2 Food Stamps 
The Food Stamp program is one of the largest in-kind welfare programs in the United 
States. It was established by the Food Stamp Act of 1964 in order to ensure that all 
individuals received adequate nutrition, and it is the only nationwide program for which low-
income individuals are categorically eligible [USDA 1992]. Food Stamp payments were 
required to reflect nutritional needs in 1971, when the maximum benefit level was 
standardized across the continental United States at the purchase price of the Department of 
Agriculture's "Thrifty Food Plan." In subsequ~nt years, this level has remained within three 
percentage points of the (inflation-adjusted) purchase price of the Thrifty Food Plan. 
In its original formulation, states had substantial discretion over the Food Stamp 
program. Participating states could restrict the program to selected localities and offer a 
payment that did not reflect nutritional needs. Laws passed in 1971 and 1974, respectively, 
abolished these options and placed other restrictions on the program. Since 1975, states have 
had minimal flexibility: states may determine (but not set criteria for) Food Stamp eligibility 
and may choose to administer Food Stamps from offices used for other social welfare 
programs, such as Aid to Families with Dependent Children and Medicaid [U.S. House of 
Representatives 1994]. 
While every state has participated in the Food Stamp program since 1975, states retain 
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the right to opt out of the program. However, the entire cost of Food Stamp payments (and 
half the cost of administration) is borne by the federal government. Given this incentive 
structure, no state legislature has ever chosen to exit the Food Stamp program. 
4.3.3 Medicaid 
. Medicaid is the fastest-growing welfare program in the United States. Established in 
1965 under the authority of Title XIX of the Social Security Act, it was designed "to assist 
States in the provision of more adequate medical care to eligible needy persons" [USDHHS 
SSA 1993]. In many states, it has become the most costly single element ()f the welfare 
benefit package. 
Medicaid programs are, like AFDC programs, designed by individual states and 
approved by the federal government. Certain criteria must be fulfilled for any Medicaid 
program; for example, states must grant Medicaid coverage to all AFDC recipients and must 
provide pediatric services for covered individuals. However, states have substantial 
discretion, both in the types ofindividuals and in the types of services that it chooses to cover. 
This discretion has led to considerable variation in Medicaid programs [USDHHS SSA 1993]. 
4.4 Calculation of the Welfare Benefit Package 
In general, government statistics. that are used to examine the welfare of the poor 
60 
assume that cash benefit programs (such as AFDC) are the sole component of the welfare 
benefit package. However, there are at least two other major social welfare programs in the 
United States: Food Stamps and Medicaid. Although the government has begun to include 
Food Stamps in some ofits benefit calculations, it does not yet include them in such politically 
sensitive data as official poverty-rate statistics. Medicaid, too, has been largely excluded from 
consideration, although for a different reason: they are excluded because, according to the 
official yearly Ways and Means committee report on welfare programs in the United States, 
"the extent to which they Increase disposable income is uncertain" [U.S. House of 
Representatives 1994]. 
In the social science literature, neither of these considerations have been mentioned 
as a reason to exclude Food Stamps and Medicaid from the welfare benefit package. 
Nevertheless, most previous empirical work in the economics and political science literatures 
has assumed that the AFDC program is the sole component of the benefit package [Orr 1976, 
Moffitt 1981, Ellwood and Bane 1986, Piskulich 1993].1 In this section, I examine the 
conceptual and data-collection issues associated with the inclusion of Food Stamps and 
Medicaid, and I conclude that both programs should be included in calculations of the total 
welfare benefit package. 
1Several political science studies actually exclude AFDC and examine Medicaid 
[Hanson 1984, Barrileaux and Miller 1988]. Since AFDC recipients comprise the bulk of 
the Medicaid eligibility pool, the exclusion of AFDC is even more problematic than the 
exclusion of Food Stamps or Medicaid. 
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4.4.1 Conceptual Issues 
There are at least two theoretical issues that might call into question the inclusion of 
Food Stamps and Medicaid. First,.AFDC recipients might be ineligible for the Food Stamp 
and Medicaid. programs. Clearly, these programs cannot form a portion of the benefit 
package if they cannot be combined with AFDC. Alternatively, AFDC recipients might face 
a sufficient number of bureaucratic obstacles that they could not take advantage of one or 
both programs even with a legal right to apply. However, almost all AFDC recipients also 
receive Food Stamp benefits [USDA 1992], and every AFDC recipient is categorically eligible 
for Medicaid [Duvall 1983], whi~h casts substantial doubt on this hypothesis. Also, federal 
law mandates that individuals who are eligible for these programs be able to receive them with 
minimal procedural obstacles. Furthermore, many states dispense all three programs from 
their AFDC local offices, which means that it is, in practice, no more difficult to apply for one 
program than it is to apply for all. 
A second possibility is that AFDC recipients might not value the goods and services 
that are offered by the Food Stamp and Medicaid programs .. Unlike the AFDC program, 
which gives cash grants to recipients, Food Stamp and Medicaid benefits are paid with goods 
and services. Economic analysis is unambiguous in its demonstration that in-kind grants are 
never worth more, and are generally worth less, to recipients than would be an unrestricted 
grant.[Varian 1994]. Thus, if recipients would not wish to consume the full amount of food 
or medicine allotted by the programs and cannot exchange the remainder for cash, they will 
value these services at a lower rate than the benefit levels would indicate. 
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Econometric evidence suggests that Food Stamp coupons are virtually equivalent to 
cash grants [Hamennesh and Johannes 1985, Moffitt 1989], which strongly suggests that they 
should be included in any welfare benefit package at their face value. Medicaid benefits, 
however, are more difficult to analyze. A number of researchers have concluded that 
Medicaid services, while not in the fonn of vouchers and not exchangeable for cash, are best 
approximated as if they were given in the fonn of cash [Blank 1989, Winkler 1991]. Others 
have argued that Medicaid benefits should be valued at their perceived worth by the average 
. . 
welfare recipient, which has been estimated at approximately 23 cents on the dollar 
. .. 
[Smeeding 1984, Murray 1994].2 Still others have attempted to determine the health of 
individual recipients, under the assumption that les.s healthy individuals should place a higher 
value on Medicaid eligibility [Moffitt and Wolfe 1992]. Although any such calculation is 
problematic, I shall discount the monetary insurance value of Medicaid eligibility by the best 
available utility valuation estimate, twenty-three percent, and include the result in the benefit 
package. 
4.4.2 Data-Collection Issues 
There are serious data-collection problems associated with each component of the 
welfare benefit package. With respect to AFDC, empirical analyses generally employ average 
2These analyses show that the utility derived by participants in government 
medical subsidy programs is an increasing function of income, with the average recipient 
valuing government-provided medical care at approximately 40 percent ofits monetary 
value. 
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A few recent studies have noted the existence of this implicit tax and compensated for 
it in their analyses [Moffitt 1990b]. While this revised procedure is an improvement over 
previous work in the literature, it does not take account of an important feature of the Food 
Stamp implicit tax: the deductions available.to Food Stamp recipients. Every family that 
receives Food Stamps is able to receive a "standard deduction," and an amount of income 
equal to this deduction is exempt from the implicit Food Stamp tax. When this deduction is 
ignored in the calculation of the total benefit package, the package overstates the effect of the 
implicit Food Stamp tax on Food. Stamp benefit levels and understates the interstate variation 
in the value of the package. 
In addition, an "excess shelter deduction" is available to all Food Stamp recipients 
who spend a sufficient amount of their income on housing expenditures. While the maximum 
amount of this deduction is fixed, recipients are allowed to claim that of the 
deduction that actually reflects their excess shelter costs. In general, the allowable deduction 
is less than the maximum amount; the average recipient uses about half of the (inflation-
adjusted) deduction, although a sizeable number of recipients use the full amount of the 
deduction. Interstate variation in the average excess shelter deduction is surprisingly small; 
the standard deviation across states in (for example) 1992 was about ten dollars, which would 
imply a three-dollar standard deviation in Food Stamp benefits across states [USDA 1992]. 
Furthermore, Food Stamp quality control data reveals that AFDC recipients are significantly 
more likely to use the maximum amount of the deduction than are other Food Stamp 
recipients. Thus, the best available approximation for this deduction is to assume that each 
recipient of the welfare package uses the entire excess shelter deduction [U.S House of 
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Representatives 1994]. Omission of this deduction would, like omission of the standard 
deduction, overstate the effect of the implicit tax and understate both interstate variation and 
the total value of the package. In this study, I include both the excess-housing deduction and 
the standard deduction. 
Finally, there is an important data-collection .difficulty with respect to Medicaid -- the 
separation of Medicaid outlays into AFDC and senior-citizen components. While most 
Medicaid expenditures in the early 1970s funded the medical needs of able-bodied individuals 
on Aid to Families with Dependent Children, elderly and disabled individuals began to form 
a higher proportion of covered individuals, and medical advances made coverage of these 
groups extremely costly relative to other individuals [Moffitt 1992]. Thus, the_ average value 
of Medicaid expenditures by state would significantly overstate the extent to which able-
bodied nonelderly recipients of the welfare benefit package use Medicaid. However, the 
dollars expended on nonelderly individuals are only published on a national basis -- that is, 
they are not published (and are not readily available) at the state level for most years. For this 
reason, those few empirical researchers who note the existence and importance of Medicaid 
have nevertheless been compelled to exclude it from consideration, or else they have used 
state data that does not differentiate between types of Medicaid users [Gramlich 1982]. For 
this study, I have obtained unpublished data from the Health Care Financing Administration 
that details state-level Medicaid use by able-bodied non-aged welfare recipients, and I include 
Medicaid use by able-bodied individuals in this analysis. 
In summary, the welfare benefit package consists of three programs: AFDC, Food 
Stamps and.Medicaid. The AFDC portion of the package is proxied by the maximum, rather 
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than the average, AFDC benefit for a family of four. The Food Stamps portion .is also proxied 
by the maximum benefit, but this benefit is adjusted by the implicit Food Stamp tax rate and 
by two deductions that are available to Food Stamp recipients. The Medicaid portion is the 
expected amount of Medicaid usage for an able~bodied adult and three children, which serves 
to exclude the senior-citizen and disabled populations, multiplied by twenty-three percent in 
order to account for its value to welfare recipients. The sum of these three components is the 
total welfare benefit package that I employ in this paper. 
4.5 An Examination of Benefit-Package Data 
Table 4.1 contains summary statistics of the benefit-package data from the first and 
last year oflliis stuay, calculatecrin accoroance with the previous sections and adjusted for 
both inflation and price differentials, for a family of four. This table illustrates the extent to 
which welfare benefit packages differ across the states. In general, the most generous state 
in each year between 1979 and 1991 offers a package that is about twice as generous as that 
of the least generous state. Interestingly, both the nation's smallest state (Vermont) and the 
nation's largest state (New York in 1979 and California in 1991) were among the most 
generous states; covariance analysis reveals that there is virtually no correlation between the 
size of a state's population and the size of its welfare benefit package. In real terms, the 
average welfare benefit package declined slightly between 1979 and 1991 (from $646 to 
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$630), but a substantial number of states offered higher benefits in 1991 than they had in 
1979. 
An examination of the states in the most and least generous categories of Table 4.1 
suggests that the benefit packages offered by states are similar across regions of the United 
States. Nine of fifteen states in the South and South Atlantic regions belong to the set of 
states whose benefit packages are least generous; none are members of the I 0 most generous 
states. On the other hand, states in New England and the Great Lakes regions are 
disproportionately represented in.the set of states whose benefit packages are most generous, 
and none are among the 10 least generous states. This observation is consistent with the 
contention of Orr [1976] and Moffitt [1990b] that regional effects play an important role in 
welfare-related issues, although it is also consistent with the hypothesis that variables ignored 
by these authors but correlated across regions are the true determinants of benefit levels in 
the United States. 
Table 4.2 compares the AFDC-Food Stamp component of state benefit packages with 
the Medicaid component in 1991 for the twenty states in Table 4.1, calculated in accordance 
with the previous section and adjusted for cost-of-living differentials. This table illustrates 
the variability of these components and the lack of correlation between them. Indeed, the 
correlation between the two components across the entire sample is quite low (.1), which 
suggests that statistical results using the total welfare package may differ from those of 
previous work. The average AFDC-Food Stamp component was $552, with a variance of 
$79, and the average Medicaid component was $338 with a variance of $93. 
While these comparisons provide insight into the data, one of the most important 
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advantages of panel data is the ability to examine intertemporal variation. In order to 
illustrate the extent of intertemporal variation in the data set, I present detailed benefit-
package data for two midwestem states, Michigan and Wisconsin, in Table 4.3. The states 
are similar in many respects, and both reduced the size of their benefit packages by 
approximately $100 for each recipient over the 1979-1991 interval, from $800 to $700. 
However, the benefit level in Michigan dropped sharply during the first few years of this 
interval and remained constant thereafter, whereas the benefit level in Wisconsin remained 
relatively constant until the last few years of the interval. A purely cross-sectional analysis 
would observe either an identical benefit (if it examint:?d a year at an endpoint of the interval) 
or a substantially different benefit (if it examined a year in the middle of the interval), but use 
of a panel data set can permit an examination of (and perhaps an explanation for) both 
occurrences. 
A final table, Table 4.4, illustrates the importance of both intertemporal variation and 
a comprehensive measure of the welfare benefit package through an examination of two 
midwestem states, Ohio and Indiana. The two states are similar in many respects, and the 
benefit package of both remained relatively constant over the 1979-1991 interval at 
approximately $600. However, the AFDC/Food Stamps component of Indiana's benefit 
package fell three times as much as that of Ohio, whereas the Medicaid component of Ohio's 
benefit package rose by considerably less than that of Indiana. For this reason, a dataset that 
excluded Medicaid would understate the benefit package offered by Indiana and overstate that 
of Ohio, whereas a dataset that excluded AFDC/Food Stamps would understate the benefit 
package offered by Ohio and overstate that oflndiana. 
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Given this examination of the data, I move to the two relationships I seek to explain. 
The next two sections present discussions of welfare recipiency and benefit determination. 
4.6 Determinants of Welfare Recipiency 
I postulate a recipient model in which welfare recipiency is a function of three factors: 
the welfare generosity of the sta~e, the labor market conditions in the state and the locational 
amenities of the state. In other ·words, 
Recipiency =/(Generosity, Labor Market, Amenities/ (1) 
_______ Jn-this-section,I-discuss-the-recipient-equation. 
4.6.1 Welfare Recipiency 
The dependent variable of the recipient equation is welfare recipiency. For this 
variable, I primarily use the proportion of state families on the welfare rolls, which I shall call 
the recipiency proportion, although I also examine the number of welfare families in a state.3 
While it may seem self-evident that an analysis of welfare recipiency should have as its 
3Use of the recipiency proportion provides a normalization with respect to state 
population. 
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dependent variable some measure of the recipient population, the seminal papers on a related 
subject (welfare-induced migration) uses poverty-rate data as its dependent variable [Peterson 
and Rom 1989, 1990]. The authors give a three-step argument in support of their decision 
to use poverty-rate data. First, they assert that the size of the .recipient population should not 
be used in analyses of welfare-induced migration because it is a function of both welfare-
induced migration and labor-leisure choice. Next, they note that poverty rates are more 
closely related to the AFDC population than other measures that have been used as a 
dependent variable in the literature. Finally, they state that many poor people spend short 
amounts of time on AFDC and then leave the program, which suggests that poverty rates may 
be far more closely related to AFDC beneficiaries than is suggested by static data. 
However, there are serious problems with the Peterson and Rom methodology. First, 
there is no obvious reason to exclude labor-leisure choice from the model; politicians are 
surely concerned with both effects, so empirical estimations of benefit choice that ignore 
labor-leisure choice reduces the relevance of these studies to debates over public policy. 
Second, the use of a poverty-rate dependent variable does not actually exclude labor-leisure 
choice from the data, as Peterson and Rom themselves suggest in a subsequent paragraph. 
In particular, although they are not convinced that changes in welfare benefits affect labor-
leisure choice, they note that "[t]o the extent these relationships exist, poverty rates within 
a state could change as a function of changes in welfare policy without any migration" --
which is precisely the argument that was used to abandon the size of the recipient population 
in favor of poverty rates. Given the failure of this variable to expunge labor-leisure effects 
and the political relevance of the labor-leisure decision, the argument that over one-third of 
71 
the poor receive AFDC makes it even more imperative to use the actual variable of interest 
(AFDC recipiency) rather than an imperfect correlate (poverty). 
4.6.2 Welfare Generosity 
Perhaps the most important measure of a state's welfare generosity is the welfare 
benefit package offered by the state. In addition, however, there are several AFDC 
administrative parameters that have been ignored by previous work but that might influence 
welfare recipiency. First, approximately one-fourth of the states in the United States offer 
presumptive eligibility to individuals who apply for AFDC. Under AFDC regulations, states 
are empowered to give welfare benefits to individuals whose applications are under review, 
-------.P-rovided a cursory ex~nation_suggests_thauhe_indhdduals_willultimately-receive-approY.al. ____ _ 
In effect, presumptive eligibility provides a lump-sum payment to applicants that should (other 
things equal) encourage individuals to enter the welfare rolls. 
Second, the number of local welfare offices exhibits enormous variation across states. 
At these local welfare offices, nonrecipients can enter the welfare rolls and recipients can 
resolve procedural difficulties. Thus, an increase in the prevalance of welfare offices should 
affect both the cost of joining the welfare rolls and the opportunity cost of leaving the welfare 
rolls. For both of these reasons, the prevalence oflocal welfare offices should exert a positive 
impact on welfare recipiency. 
Finally, states are allowed to offer additional allowances to AFDC recipients who 
become pregnant. In a paper that has been highly influential in both academic and political 
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circles, Ellwood and Bane [ 1986] argue that welfare recipients are not encouraged to have 
additional children by any additional welfare payment they would receive for such children. 
While there is no empirical evidence to suggest that Ellwood and Bane are in error, their 
result is peculiar because it appears to ·contradict fundamental tenets of consumer theory. In 
particular, it has been shown that a decrease in the price of a normal good induces individuals 
to consume more of that good [Varian 1994], yet the Ellwood-Bane result suggests that 
individuals do not respond to economic incentives where pregnancy is concerned. An 
important and.generally ignored (including by Ellwood and Bane) aspect of state welfare 
policies is that an additional allowance for pregnancy can be received in some states as early 
as the sixth month of pregnancy. A positive relationship between we.lfare recipiency and 
pre.gnancy subsidies, while not a direct test of the Ellwood-Bane result, would suggest that 
(at least in some contexts) pregnancy is (like most other goods) affected by economic 
incentives. 
4.6.3 Labor-Market Conditions 
To this point, we have considered the welfare generosity of a state and we have 
concluded that states with more generous welfare packages should experience higher levels 
of welfare recipiency. There is, however, another factor that may influence welfare recipiency 
-- the opportunity cost of abandoning the labor market. Just as relatively generous welfare 
benefit packages should induce individuals to leave the labor market for the welfare rolls, 
relatively favorable labor-market conditions should induce individuals to leave the welfare 
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rolls for the labor market. 
There are at least two important job-related considerations: the unemployment rate 
of a state and the average wage offered by that state. When unemployment is low and wages 
are high, labor-market prospects are favorable and individuals will face a higher opportunity 
cost if they exit the labor market; when unemployment is high and wages are low, labor-
·market prospects are unfavorable and individuals will face a lower opportunity cost if they 
exit the labor market. For this reason, unemployment should be positively related to welfare 
recipiency and wages should. be negatively related to welfare recipiency. A third 
consideration, unmarried birth rates, is important for a different reason -- such births facilitate 
entrance onto the welfare rolls and thereby raise the opportunity cost associated with work. 
4.6.4 Amenities 
There is a sizeable economics literature on locational amenities. In general, these 
works attempt to derive hedonic prices for amenities in order to compare the "quality of life" 
across states or metropolitan areas. Rosen [ 1979], the pioneering work in this literature, 
found that locational amenities affect the prevailing wage offered by a jurisdiction. ,He 
identified four types of locational amenities that are relevant to individual decisionmaking: 
climate, crime, crowding, and pollution. Subsequent work examined wages and housing rents 
[Roback 1982, 1988, Blomquist et al. 1988] and migration [Graves 1979, Porell 1982, 
Greenwood et al. 1991] with respect to amenities and found that amenities affect all of these 
variables in the manner predicted by economic theory. To the extent that migration is 
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possible among welfare recipients, the number of welfare recipients in a state should be 
positively related to the amenities offered by that state, and the recipiency proportion should 
be affected by any amenity to which recipients and nonrecipients exhibit a differential 
response. 
Perhaps the seminal study of welfare migration in the political science literature 
[Peterson and Rom 1989] asserts that the inclusion of locational amenities is necessary to 
control for their effects on welfare recipiency and asserts that the change in population of a 
state is a useful proxy for those ~enities. While their inclusion as control variables is useful, 
it is unclear that population changes (while affected by amenities) actually proxy for their 
effects, and such a supposition is in any event unnecessary. It is both possible and desirable 
to use actual data on locational amenities rather than assuming that population will proxy for 
4. 7 Determinants of the Benefit Package 
I postulate a benefit model in which the size of the welfare benefit package in a state 
is a function of four factors: the matching-rate incentives faced by a state, the political 
opinions of state citizens and the partisan affiliation of state officials, the strength of pro-
redistribution constituencies and state economic conditions. In other words, 
Benefit package =/(Matching-Rate Effects, Politics, Constituencies, Economics). (2) 
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In this section, l discuss the benefit equation. 
4. 7.1 Matching-Rate Incentives 
Perhaps the most important variable with respect to funding for the AFDC program 
is the Federal Medical Assistance Percentage. This percentage, which differs by state and is 
roughly proportional to per capita disposable income, is the federal matching rate for the 
AFDC program. These rates generally range from 50% for the wealthiest states to 65% for 
the poorest states. Previous work has noted the existence of matching-rate differentials and 
suggested that these differentials affect the size of the welfare benefit package in a state 
[Moffitt 1984, 1990b; Orr 1976], although a surprising number of studies have ignored 
_______ matching_rates_as_a_detenninant-olstate-benefit-Ievels-f P-eter-son-and-Rom-1-989]-. --------
A theoretical difficulty with the use of matching rates is that states may choose to 
employ an alternative matching formula that matches most of the first $32 of AFDC benefits 
but none thereafter. Since even the least generous state offered AFDC benefits at least twice 
as large as the matched amount by 1979, use of this alternative matching formula would 
always lower the amount of money received from the federal government. Despite (or 
perhaps because of) this property, several states remained on the older formula until 1983. 
Moffitt [1984] regards this tendency as "curious" and excludes these states from subsequent 
work, both for their seeming irrationality and for this formula's lack of compatibility with the 
F.M.A.P. formula. However, a political decision to remain on the old formula need not be 
irrational - state policymakers who view AFDC as a "public bad" rather than a public good 
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might believe that the political incentives of a switchover will inevitably produce higher AFDC 
benefits, and the lesser federal support offered by the old formula might be an acceptable price 
to pay in order to lessen the probability. Also, there is no fundamental incompatibility with 
the newer formula: the older formula pays a fixed amount of approximately twenty-five 
dollars and matches at a marginal rate of zero, while the newer formula pays a fixed amount 
of zero dollars but matches at a marginal rate of at least fifty percent. Thus, a 
reparameterization of the matching formula into its two components (a fixed payment and a 
matching rate) permits the inclusion of every state. Finally, it can be argued that the matching 
rate faced by a state should be measured by the most generous rate to which they are legally 
entitled. Under this assumption, which I shall employ in this paper, every state should be 
modeled as if it were on the newer formula. 4 
An empirical problem with the matching-rate formula is that it is, by definition, a 
function of personal income. Traditional work predicts that the welfare benefit package 
offered by a state will be positively related to per capita income because altruism will induce 
relatively wealthy citizens to favor higher benefits for the poor [Orr 1976]. However, the 
matching-rate formula guarantees that states with higher per capita income will receive a less 
generous matching rate from the federal government. 5 Thus, a positive .coefficient for the 
matching-rate variable is entirely plausible in this framework and it is not possible to 
4Technically, a state cannot switch to the newer formula unless it chooses to offer 
Medicaid. 
5The matching-rate formula also introduces the problem of endogeneity, because 
public policy decisions that would improve state personal income must reduce the federal 
matching rate for the state. 
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distinguish altruism effects from the extent to which matching-rate considerations influence 
state benefit-setting. 
Fortunately, it is possible to examine matching-rate effects through another variable: 
the extent to which the non-federal share of AFDC is paid by local (rather than state) 
governments. States are empowered to shift the cost burden of AFDC cit;tto counties or other 
localities, and a considerable number of states have done so in any given year. To the extent 
that state officials view such cost-shifting as a costless grant from localities to states, cost-
shifting should encourage states to offer higher welfare benefit packages. Thus, cost-shifting 
provides a measure of the extent to which state legislatures respond to matching-rate 
considerations. 
There is one consideration that might affect this prediction: the existence of local 
boards with some decisionmaking authority over welfare administration in their local areas. 
States are permitted but not required to delegate a portion of their authority to these boards, 
and approximately one-half of states have chosen to do so in any given year.· In general, there 
is no reason to believe that local boards would systematically encourage or discourage welfare 
expenditures by states, and a cursory examination by Tresch [1976] finds no evidence that 
local boards affect state welfare policy. However, this result may be due to model 
misspecification. In particular, locally elected welfare board members have a powerful 
incentive to curtail social spending in states where localities must pay for a portion of the 
spending because local officials would be directly responsible for the increased taxation 
caused by high welfare expenditures. Thus, it appears that local boards should be included 
as an interactive variable (with cost-shifting) in order to capture a local-board effect. 
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4. 7.2 Politics and Political Opinion 
Past work in political science suggests that states in which politics is intertwined with 
morality will be more likely to provide generous AFDC benefits because the absence of such 
generosity would be immoral [Peterson and Rom 1989]. As previously noted, however, 
benevolence need not imply generous welfare benefits for the poor when such benefits will 
induce individuals to choose leisure over labor; even when labor-leisure effects are absent, 
benevolence might imply generosity with respect to private donations rather than compulsory 
taxation. Therefore, the tax burden borne by states probably measures the policy liberalism 
of a state rather than the moralism of its political culture. Viewed in this light, the finding of 
Peterson and Rom that high-tax states offer higher welfare benefits is easily understood. 
_________ D~esQite Pe_t_e_(s_on_and_Rom'.s_misinterpretation,-the-policy-liberalism-of-a-state's-----
electorate is relevant to benefit determination. Several measures have been used in the 
literature to proxy for policy liberalism, including state tax progressivity [Spall 1978] and 
warm-weather climate [Cebula 1981]. However, there are a number of measures that would 
provide a more direct measure of policy liberalism on the part of the electorate, and previous 
work has found that these measures exert a significant influence on state public policy 
[Erikson, Wright and Mclver 1989]. 
Another state political factor is the partisan affiliation of state officials. Since the size 
of a state's welfare benefit package is selected by state politicians, politicians with liberal 
views should choose to offer a relatively high welfare benefit package. Perhaps the most 
common measure of the liberalism of state officials is their partisan affiliation, and it is 
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hypothesized that states whose legislative or executive branches are controlled by Democrats 
will produce relatively liberal public policy outcomes. This conclusion, however, is crucially 
dependent on two assumptions. First, the two major political parties must have held opposite 
positions on welfare policy during.the years under consideration, but it is far from clear that 
(at least until recent years) Democrats supported social spending and Republicans opposed 
it. Second, the partisan affiliation of state officeholders must contain information over and 
above state public opinion. Fortunately, data on the political affiliation of state legislators and 
state governors is readily available, so it is possible to test the hypothesis that Democratic 
legislatures and executives should provide higher welfare benefit packages to the poor. 
In addition to these variables, previous work in political science has suggested that 
state welfare policy is affected by the extent to states have strong two-party systems and 
class-based cleavages [Jennings 1979, Fry and Winters 1970]. This literature postulates that 
states with these characteracteristics will be characterized by greater "political influence" (of 
the poor) and that this influence will (independent of the partisan affiliation of state officials 
or the policy liberalism of the electorate) lead to a higher welfare benefit package. While 
political influence has been ignored by the economics literature, Peterson and Rom [1989, 
1990] construct a measure for it in their seminal work on welfare recipiency and find it to be 
highly significant. In order to examine the importance of political influence and to maintain 
comparability with past work, I calculate a measure of political influence and include it in the 
model. 
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4. 7.3 Constituencies 
'.fhere is good reason to believe that welfare recipiency, which is the dependent 
variable in the recipiency equation, is endogenous to the benefit-determination decision: 
Interest-group models predict that the voting impact of a given constituency is determined 
by the proportion of the electorate who belong to the constituency [Plotnick 1986]. In other 
words, the political power of a given interest is (at least in a democratic society) positively 
related to its support among .the electorate. According to these models, the recipiency 
proportion should be positively related to the size of the welfare benefit package. 
Previous empirical work suggests that welfare generosity does not encourage 
unmarried births [Ellwood and Bane 1985]. However, such a conclusion does not negate the 
possibility that unmarried births affect state benefit levels. Since unmarried births facilitate 
entrance onto the welfare rolls, a larger proportion of unmarried births suggests larger voter 
support for redistributive programs. Therefore, other things equal, a larger proportion of 
unmarried births should imply a higher level of welfare benefits. 
4. 7.4 Economics 
There are two separate econorruc factors that may be relevant to benefit 
determination: unemployment and wages. With respect to wages, traditional work in the 
altruism literature predicts that higher-wage jurisdictions will offer higher levels of welfare 
.. benefits because the provision of such levels is less costly (in utility terms) for individuals in 
81 
higher-wage jurisdictions [Orr 1976]. With respect to unemployment, however, it is difficult 
to make a prediction. On the one hand, politicians who sympathize with poor economic 
conditions might choose to increase the size of the welfare benefit package when 
unemployment is high; on the other hand, politicians who fear a large influx of recipients 
might choose to decrease the size of the welfare benefit package when unemployment is high. 
4.8 The Model 
4.8.1 Estimation Technique 
There are two equations to be estimated: the recipient equation and the benefit 
equation. Since the dependent variable of each equation is an endogenous variable the 
other, there is a simultaneous-equations problem. In particular, since welfare recipiency is a 
function of the welfare benefit package and the welfare benefit package is a function of 
welfare recipiency, a single-equation estimator such as ordinary least squares will not produce 
effiCient coefficient estimates [Greene 1990]. In fact, the estimates will be inconsistent, which 
strongly suggests that a simultaneous-equations estimator should be employed. 
Also, the data is of a panel nature, which presents cross-sectional and time-series 
difficulties. When the dependent variable of an observation is partially determined by its time-
series (year) or cross-sectional (state) identity, a failure to account for these attributes will 
bias the coefficient estimates of any independent variable that is correlated with years or states 
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[Hsiao 1986]. Under the assumption that these effects (whether caused by the years/states 
themselves or by omitted-variable bias) involve a time-series component independent of state 
and a cross-sectional component independent of time, the introduction of dummy variables 
(fixed-effects) for states and years is sufficient to produce unbiased and consistent coefficient 
estimates. 
Finally, there is a boundary problem associated with the recipiency proportion. In 
order for the underlying assumptions of hypothesis testing to hold, it is necessary that the 
distribution from which the dependent variable is drawn be unbounded [Greene 1990]. 
However, the recipiency proportion is (by definition) limited to the [O, 1] interval, which 
implies that standard hypothesis-test statistics for a recipiency-proportion model would not 
test the hypotheses they are intended to examine. A log-odds transformation of the recipiency 
proportion, In ((RP/(1-RP)) where RP is the recipiency_Rroportion, is sufficient to eliminate,__ ___ _ 
the boundary problem. 
The estimation technique employed in this study is fixed-effects two-stage least 
squares. This technique is a simultaneous-equations estimator that compensates for both 
time-series and cross-sectional correlations. Since regional effects have been important in 
past work that did not have enough data to employ state fixed-effects, I estimate both state 
and regional fixed-effects models for purposes of comparison. As previously noted, the 
recipiency equation is estimated for two related dependent variables, the (log-odds of the) 
recipiency proportion and the number of welfare families, although I shall focus on the 
recipiency-proportion results. 
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4.8.2 Equations and Hypotheses 
The recipiency model is of the form 
Recipiencyu =a+ b1Package11 + bj'regSubu + b30ffices;, + b,,PresElig;, + b5Unempu + 
bJncomeu + b.j;rime;, + b8UnBirthsu + br;Sunu + buflospu + buSuperfundu 
+ b12Urbanu + £duYear1+ £d2ptate; + e; + k1 + Uu 
where each b.Jk and djk is a regression coefficient, a is a constant term, Year; represents time-
series dummies, State1 represents cross-sectional dummies, e; represents a cross-sectional 
fixed-effect, k, represents a time-series fixed-effect and llu represents a normally distributed 
error term. The variables are c_o_ded_as_follows: ____________________ _ 
Recipiencyu is the (log-odds of the) proportion of families on the welfare rolls. 
Packageu is the welfare benefit package level as measured by this paper. 
PregSubu is a dummy variable that denotes the presence of a pregnancy subsidy. 
Officesu is the number of welfare offices per capita. 
PresEligu is a dummy variable that denotes the presence of presumptive eligibility. 
Unemp;~ is the proportion of job-seekers in a state. 
lncomeu is the average wage. 
UnBirths;1 is the proportion of all births that occur to unmarried mothers. 
Crime11 is the Federal Bureau oflnvestigation's crime index. 
Sunu is the percentage of time that a state receives sunlight. 
Superfundu is the number of Superfund sites per square mile. 
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Hosp11 is the number of hospitals per capita. 
Urbanit is the percentage of citizens who live in urban areas. 
These variables may be divided into three categories: welfare generosity, labor-market 
conditions and locational amenities. For welfare generosity, there are four measures: the size 
of the welfare benefit package, the presence of a pregnancy subsidy, the number of welfare 
offices per capita and the presence of presumptive eligibility. Each of these variables 
increa5es the welfare generosity of a state, and each should be associated with a higher level 
of welfare recipiency. For labor market opportunities, there. are three variables: the 
proportion of job-seekers in a state, the per capita income of a state and the proportion of 
unmarried births in a state. Job-seeking and unmarried births should be associated with a 
higher level of welfare recipiency, while per capita income should be associated with a 
negative level of welfare recipiency. Finally, there are five measures oflocational amenities: 
the crime rate, the amount of sunlight, the number of hospitals per capita, the prevalance of 
Superfund sites and the urban percentage. The coefficients of these variables cannot be 
predicted a priori in the recipient-proportion framework because they measure the relative 
attraction of the amenities to welfare recipients as compared to the general population. In the 
family-based equation, however, crime, Superfund sites and urban percentage should be 
negatively related to the number of welfare recipients; sunlight and hospitals should be 
positively related to the number of welfare recipients. 
The benefit model is of the form 
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Package;,= c + b2iAefatchRateit + b22CostShi.ftit + b2}3oardit + b2,,BoarditCostShi.ftit 
+ b2}JemLeg;1 + b26DemGovit + b2.JJemLeg;/JemGov;, + b2JJemPres;, + 
b2;'ollnfit + b30UnBirths;, + b31UnDifu + b32Unemp;, + b3fiecipiency;1 + 
b34Wageit + J;dJtYear, + J;d2tState1 + e, + k, + uit 
where each b1k and d;k is a r~gression coefficient, a is a constant term, w is an index variable 
to distinguish between the recipiency-proportion and family-based models, Year; represents 
time-series dummies, State1 represents cross-sectional dummies, e1 represents a cross-sectional 
fixed-effect, k, represents a time-series fixed-effect and u11 represents a normally distributed 
error term. The variables are coded as follows: 
Benefit11 is the welfare benefit package as calculated by the methodology of this 
MatchRate11 is the percentage of the welfare package that states must pay. 
CostShift11 is a dummy variable that denotes the. presence oflocal cost-shifting. 
Boardit is a dummy variable that denotes the presence oflocally elected welfare 
boards. 
BoarditCostShiftu denotes the interaction between cost-shifting and local boards. 
DemLeg11 is a dummy variable that denotes a state legislature in which both chambers 
are controlled by Democrats. 
DemGovit is a dummy variable that denotes a Democratic governor. 
DemLegitDemGov11 is a dummy variable that denotes a Democratic legislature and a 
Democratic governor. 
DemPres11 is the popular vote received by the most recent Democratic presidential 
candidate. 
Polin/;, is the Peterson-Rom measure of political influence. 
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UnBirths" is the proportion of all births that are to unmarried mothers. 
UnDi};,is the difference of the proportion of white births to white unmarried mothers 
and the proportion of nonwhite births to nonwhite unmarried mothers. 
Unemp,, is the proportion of job-seekers. 
Recipiency11 is the (log-odds of) the proportion of families on the welfare rolls. 
lncomeit is the average wage. 
These variables may be divided into four categories: matching-rate incentives, politics, 
constituencies and economics: For matching-rate incentives, there are four measures: the 
federal matching rate, the presence of local cost-shifting, the presence of locally elected 
welfare boards and an interactive term involving local cost-shifting and locally elected welfare 
boards. The presence of local cost-shifting should be positively related to the size of the 
welfare benefit package, while the federal matching rate and the board/cost-shifting term 
shoulffoe negatively relateo to the size of the welfare benefit package. For politics, there are 
a number of variables: the percentage of state citizens who supported the most recent 
Democratic presidential candidate, the presence oflocal boards, the presence of a Democratic 
legislature, the presence of a Democratic governor, and an interaction between a Democratic 
legislature and a Democratic governor. Each of these variables should be associated with a 
higher welfare benefit package. For constituencies, there are two measures: the recipiency 
proportion and the proportion of births to unmarried mothers. Each of these variables should 
be associated with a higher welfare benefit package. Finally, there are two economic 
variables: the proportion of individuals seeking employment and the average wage available 
to workers. There are no predicted signs for these variables. 
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The means and variances of each variable are presented in Table 4.5. This table 
illustrates that both the independent and dependent variables exhibit substantial variation. 
4.8.3 Data Sources for Welfare Variables 
The data covers the continental United States, including the District of Columbia, 
from 1979 to 1991.6 AFDC, Food Stamp and Medicaid data were obtained from various 
years of Characteristics of Stqte Plans for Aid to Families with Dependent Children, 
Characteristics of Food Stamp Recipients, the Green Book, the Statistical Abstract of the 
United States, and the Annual Statistical Supplement of the Social Security Bulletin. 
Unpublished Food Stamps and Medicaid data were obtained from the Departments of 
Agriculture and Health and Human Services. 
4.9 Empirical Results 
4.9.1 Recipiency Results 
The statistical results, which are presented in the last column of Table 4.6, provide 
mixed evidence on the importance of welfare generosity. The coefficient for the welfare 
6Three states are excluded from the analysis: Alaska, Hawaii and Nebraska. The 
exclusion of Alaska and Hawaii is due to migration-cost issues; Nebraska is omitted 
. because of its unicameral nonpartisan state legislature. 
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benefit package is positive but insignificant at the 5% level, which means that the effect of the 
welfare benefit pacakage is not statistically different from zero. 7 On the other hand, both the 
presence of a pregnancy subsidy and the prevalence of welfare· offices exert a statistically 
significant effect on welfare recipiency. These findings suggest that additional welfare offices 
reduce the cost of applying for the welfare benefit package and that individuals consider 
economic incentives with respect to pregnancy. Interestingly, the regional-effects model 
(which previous work was compelled to use due to a smaller number of observations) gives 
a statistically significant positive effect for the welfare benefit package; these results, which 
are also presented in Table 4.6, suggest that the omission of state fixed-effects has caused 
previous work to overstate the effects of the welfare benefit package on individual incentives. 
Labor-market conditions also exert a statistically significant effect on welfare 
recipiency. The proportion of job-seekers in a state is positive and significant, which suggests 
that a difficult labor market encourages individuals to enter the welfare rolls. In addition, the 
coefficient associated with per capita income is negative and significant, which suggests that 
the opportunity cost associated with welfare is higher in states with higher-paying jobs. Both 
of these results are consistent with the hypothesis that welfare recipiency is affected by 
economic forces. In addition, unmarried births exert a positive and significant effect, which 
is consistent with the hypothesis that unmarried births facilitate entrance onto the welfare 
rolls. 
7The insignificance of the package (which is an instrument) is consistent with the 
hypothesis that a simultaneous-equations framework was unnecessary. However, this 
hypothesis may be tested with a Hausman test [Green 1990]; the appropriate statistic has 
a value of200.1 with a critical value of 88.3 at the .05 level, so the hypothesis is rejected 
in favor of the simultaneous-equations framework. 
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In general, amenities do not appear to exert a differential effect on recipients and 
nonrecipients. There is, however, an exception: welfare recipients appear to be relatively 
averse to Superfund sites. One reason for this might be that the relative poverty of welfare 
recipients compels them to live near such sites. A second possibility, which has been 
suggested by previous work, is that polluters choose. to pollute in low-income areas in order 
to minimize the risk oflegal challenge [Coursey 1994]. This result is interesting, and it bears 
further investigation. 
Table 4. 7 interprets the. recipient-equation results for a state with average welfare 
recipiency. For a state with average welfare recipiency, the presenc·e of a pregnancy subsidy 
increases the size of the welfare rolls by 5.54% and a doubling of the number of welfare 
offices increases the size of the welfare rolls by 12.68%, which underlines the importance of 
welfare-related factors to individual decisionmaking. A one-percent (absolute) increase in the 
rate of unemployment increases the size of the welfare rolls by 1.92%, while a $1000 increase 
in the average (yearly) wage causes a 9.92% reduction in the size of the welfare rolls; both 
of these factors highlight the importance oflabor-market conditions to welfare recipiency. 
Finally, a one-percent (absolute) increase in the proportion of babies born to ·unmarried 
mothers increases the size of the welfare rolls by 2. 00% and a doubling of state Superfund 
sites increases the size of the welfare rolls by 0. 71 %. 
While the ratio-based equation provides a better measure of welfare recipiency than 
the family-based equation, an examination of the family-based equation is instructive because 
of its implications for locational amenities. The family-based fixed-effects equation, which 
is presented in the third column ofTable4.6, confirms the hypothesis that welfare families, 
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like other individuals, migrate in order to receive better amenity packages. States with lower 
crime rates, more sunlight, more rural areas and higher per capita incomes tend to attract 
larger numbers of welfare recipients. On the other hand, states with large numbers of 
Superfund sites also seem to attract welfare recipients, contrary to expectations, and hospitals 
appear to exert an indeterminate effect on the size of the welfare rolls. In general, then, the 
family state-effects equation confirms the hypothesis that welfare families, like other 
individuals, migrate in response to interstate amenity differentials. 
4.9 .2 Benefit Results 
The statistical results, which are presented in the last column of Table 4.8, provide 
and economic considerations in the benefit-
setting process. None of the matching-rate variables attain statistical significance. However, 
two political variables attain significance in the predicted direction, Democratic control of 
state government and political influence. On the other hand, the policy liberalism of a state 
appears to exert a negative and significant effect on the size of the welfare benefit package, 
which suggests that further work is needed on this issue. 
With respect to constituency variables, it does not appear that welfare recipiency 
exerts a significant effect on the welfare benefit package. However, births to unmarried 
mothers exert a positive and significant effect on welfare benefit packages. If an additional 
one percent of total births were to occur tp unmarried mothers, state benefit levels would rise 
by about three· dollars, which suggests that a larger proportion of unmarried births does 
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translate into a larger pool of voters who support welfare expenditures. The difference 
between unmarried birth rates for minorities and whites does not exert a significant effect on 
the size of the package, which is consistent with the hypothesis that racial motivations do not 
affect welfare politics. 
These results are generally echoed by the family-based state-effects framework. 
Interestingly, however, the regional fixed-effects models find that virtually all variables attain 
statistical significance in the predicted directions. In these models, which are also presented 
in Table 4.7, both local cost-shifting and local boards exert significant positive effects on state 
benefit levels, while the interaction of these effects induces a significant negative effect on the 
levels. Democratic control of state government, political influence and Democratic 
presidential support are all positive and significant. These findings, like similar findings in the 
recipient equation, suggest that the inability of previous work (because of data limitations) 
to include state fixed-effects has biased their results toward the hypothesis that political and 
economic considerations influence the decisions of state officials. 
4.10 The Importance of State Fixed-Effects 
When unobservable factors constant across states affect a dependent variable, 
econometric models that do not account for these factors will produce biased coefficient 
estimates. In all probability, each state has unique attributes that are difficult to quantify but 
are nevertheless present. Two examples relevant to the issue of welfare recipiency are Utah, 
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in which the Mormon church performs a number of government-like activities, and the 
mountain states, in which both liberal and conservative residents have an unusual belief in self-
sufficiency. By including state fixed-effects, econometric results are (under certain 
conditions) unbiased despite the existence of these effects. 
Table 4.9 provides a graphical illustration of the state fixed-effects coefficients of the 
previous section. In the graph, the horizontal axis refers to the recipiency equation and the 
vertical axis refers to the benefit equation. The graph reveals a substantial amount of 
interstate variation in the fixed-effect coefficients; for example, the benefit equation 
coefficients have a range of $328. It also suggests that the two types of fixed effects are 
largely independent of each other; regression of each on the other yields a positive but 
statistically insignificant result. 
----------In-gener-al,past-w0Fk-has-empl0yed-regi0nal-fixed-effeets-rather-than-state-fixed-~---­
effects because of the relatively small size of their data sets. For example, the seminal work 
in the "welfare magnet" literature, Peterson and Rom [1990], considered a model with 
regional fixed-effects and reached two conclusions that are consistent with previous work in 
the literature. First, Peterson and Rom found some evidence that interstate welfare 
differentials affect welfare recipiency, although their results were neither robust to 
specification nor (in most cases) valid at the 0.05 or 0.01 level of significance. Second, 
Peterson and Rom found overwhelming evidence that state welfare policy is driven by 
concern over welfare recipiency, which suggests that (whether or not high-benefit states 
actually act as "welfare magnets") states with relatively high benefits will act as if the "welfare 
magnet" problem is qualitatively significant. 
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The middle column ofTables 4.6 and 4.7 present results for the recipient and benefit 
equations under a regional fixed-effects framework; while these equations are estimated using 
a more comprehensive measure of the welfare benefit package and an improved econometric 
technique, they are analogous to previous work in the literature. 8 The results largely echo the 
conclusions of Peterson and Rom: the size of the welfare benefit package is significant at the 
0.05 level, and a number of political variables become significant in the predicted direction. 
These results suggest that individuals do respond to interstate welfare differentials, and that 
welfare-related concerns play an important role in the determination of state public policy. 
Since the policy implications derived from the state and regional fixed-effects models 
are fundamentally different, it is crucial to determine whether use of the state fixed-effects 
model can be econometrically justified. In separate tests, both state and regional fixed-effects 
are (in their respective frameworks) jointly significant, which suggests that some sort of fixed-
effects framework is appropriate. In order to determine whether it is necessary to use state 
fixed-effects, however, it is necessary to test whether the coefficients of states within any 
single region are equal. 
Table 4.9 does not provide a great deal of support for the regional fixed-effects 
hypothesis. The upper right quadrant of the graph, for example, contains states from the 
East, the Midwest, and California. Since a regional fixed-effects framework would not permit 
such a result, the regional fixed-effects framework would fail to capture variation for which 
a state fixed-effects framework could account. Equality tests confirm this result -- for every 
8The precise model employed by Peterson and Rom is beset by both theoretical 
and empirical problems, but a reestimation of their model using the data set in this paper 
revealed qualitatively similar results. 
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region, the hypothesis that state fixed-effects are equal can be rejected at the 0.01 level, 
although equality of mountain-state coefficients (which appear from Table 4.9 to be the most 
similar) cannot be rejected at the 0.005 level. This finding suggests that the regional fixed-
effects rµodel is inappropriate, which supports the results of this paper but calls the 
conclusions of previous work into question. 
4.11 Conclusion 
In this paper, I have examined the issues. of welfare rec1p1ency and benefit 
determination. I have found some evidence that welfare generosity affects state welfare 
recipiency. I have found mixed evidence on the question of whether liberal public opinion and 
Democratic state governments induce higher welfare benefit packages. I have devised a test 
to overcome matching-rate difficulties but I have found little evidence that state governments 
respond to matching-rate effects. In addition, I have found that welfare recipients respond 
to amenity differentials and that labor-market conditions affect welfare recipiency. 
The data used in this paper differs from previous work in at least two important 
respects. First, the data set is considerably more extensive than has been seen in the literature. 
The data set contains yearly observations from 1979 to 1991, which permits both more 
efficient estimation than previous work and an examination of dynamic effects that have been 
largely omitted from previous work. In addition, the welfare benefit package is measured 
more precisely than has been seen in the literature. By including the three largest welfare 
---------------------------------------
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benefit programs available to non-aged able-bodied adults, I have obtained a relatively broad 
measure of the welfare benefit package. In addition, I have resolved severe data questions 
with respect to Medicaid and I have accounted for problematic Food Stamp regulations. 
There are several other respects in which this paper improves over past work. I have 
recognized that the political and migration/labor-leisure aspects of welfare recipiency are not 
independent and I have compensated for this fact in my estimation technique. I have also 
included measures of job-seeking and amenities in order to better capture the economic 
choices of the welfare population. Finally, I have considered a number of model 
specifications and found that many of the conclusions of this paper are sensitive to 
specification. 
These results are interesting in light of the debate over welfare magnets and the 
nationalization of welfare ~olicy:. ProP-onents of redistrihuJion_argue_for_a_uniform_national-----
benefit level in the' United States on the grounds that, in a federal system, states that pursue 
social justice will become "welfare magnets" and will be compelled to curtail or eliminate 
redistributive activities. Oddly enough, opponents of redistribution argue against a uniform 
national benefit level in the United States on the same grounds -- that federalism rewards low-
benefit states and penalizes high-benefit states. The findings of this paper suggest that welfare 
generosity affects welfare recipiency, but in a manner that is considerably more complex than 
has been considered by previous work. The central findings of this paper provide some 
support for the arguments of both ideological positions and call for a renewed examination 
of the normative justification of welfare programs as well as renewed research into the 
relationship between welfare generosity and welfare recipiency. 
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Appendix 
Table 4.1: Real Benefit Levels, 1991 and 1979 
The Bottom 10 
State 1991 1979 
MS 430.86 448.27 
AL 448.71 495.45 
TX 505.10 501.93 
AZ 516.34 504.82 
AR 524.76 535.88 
TN 530.29 487.00 
LA 539.99 513.62 
SC 546.67 448.99 
KY 547.82 581.12 
WV 554.86 609.68 
State 1991 1979 
CA 793.15 783.60 
MA 756.07 747.68 
NY 754.01 874.71 
VT 752.55 764.47 
MN 736.08 765.60 
OR 734.37 764.90 
CT 716.15 734.46 
ND 706.23 749.05 
RI 705.76 704.21 
DC 700.47 691.67 
Mean 629.79 646.25 
Variance 80.46 102.80 
Note: Means and variances are for the ·entire 1991 and 1979 samples. All dollar amounts 
have been adjusted for inflation. 
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Table 4.2: Components of the Benefit Package, 1991 






























































































Note: Means and variances are for the entire 1991 sample. All dollar amounts have been 
adjusted for inflation. 
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Table 4.5: Variable Summary 
Independent variable Units. Mean Var. 
Benefit package Po liars 611.30 92.03 
Pregnancy subsidy Dummy 0.20 0.40 
Presumptive eligibility Dummy 0.24 0.42 
Welfare offices Per capita. 0.021 0.018 
Job-seeking population Thousands 324.76 373.87 
Proportion of births to unmarried mothers Percentage 21.51 8.28 
F.B.I. Uniform Crime Index Per capita 5156 1477 
Sunlight Percentage 59.31 8.98 
Superfund sites Per square mile 0.0007 0.0028 
Hospitals Per capita (1000) 0.037 0.017 
Urban percentage Percentage 66.76 21.83 
Per capita income Dollars 12548 2099 
Welfare Families Families 73274 100587 
Recipiency Proportion Log-odds -2.90 0.41 
Democratic presidential support Percentage 0.44 0.09 
Democratic state legislature Dummy 0.61 0.48 
Democratic governor Dummy 0.60 0.49 
Democratic state government Dummy O.J-7- 0.48 
Political influence Percentage 0.43 0.08 
Matching rate Percentage 57.55 12.19 
Local cost-shifting Duminy 0.21 0.40 
Local boards Dummy 0.52 0.50 
Local cost-shifting with local boards Dummy . 0.17 0.38 
Birth difference - minorities and whites Percentage 34.33 14.41 
Unemployment rate Percentage 6.75 2.20 
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Table 4.6: Recipient Results, Two-Stage Least Squares 
PROP-RE FAM-SE PROP-SE 
Intercept -3.8081 ** 414638.5** -1.2122 
(0.3139) (97415.4) (0.7634) 
Benefit Package 0.0021 ** 47.09 0.0001 
(Instrument) (0.0004) (85.78) (0.0001) 
Pregnancy Subsidy 0.1223** 3120.44 0.0587* 
(1.3489) (3647.76) (0.0284) 
Offices Per Capita -0.0031 ** 488.16 0.0065* 
(0.0010). (341.60) (0.0027) 
Presumptive Elig. 0.1177** 
(0.0285) 
Job-seeking Pop. 43.50** 
(6.78) 
Unemployment Rate 0.0615** 0.0202** 
Per Capita Income -0.0642** -4.10** -0.1048** 
(0.0104) (1.46) (0.0119) 
· Unmarried Births 0.0041 ** -22.28 0.0021 ** 
(0.0002) (53.40) (0.0004) 
Crime Index -0.033** 2968.69 0.0007 
(0.012) (1675.93) (0.0133) 
Sunlight -0.0080** 
(0.0022) 
Hospitals Per Capita -0.0015 -1894.43** 0.0017 
(0.0012) (425.66) (0.0331) 
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Superfund Sites 0.0206** -1961.06** -0.0118** 
(0.0048) (563.95) (0.0044) 
Urban Percentage 0.1416 -4208.81** -1.1583 
(0.0834) {1112.91) (0.8552) 
Observations 624 624 624 
Independent Var. 31 68 68 
Adjusted R-squared .79 .98 .94 
Note: The log-odds of the recipiency ratio (PROP) is the dependent variable in the first and 
last columns of the table. The number of welfare families (FAM) is the dependent variable 
in the middle column. 
Note: All models were estimate~ with time-series fixed-effects. In addition, the second and 
third columns were estimated with state fixed-effects (SE); the first column was estimated 
with regional fixed-effects (RE) but without state fixed-effects. · 
* denotes significance at the . 05 level. 
** denotes significance at the .01 level. 
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Table 4. 7: Elasticities of the Recipiency Equation 
Results are for a state with average welfare recipiency. 
Variable Change Absolute Relative 
Pregnancy subsidy Added +0.31% + 5.54% 
Welfare offices per capita Doubled +0.71% +12.68% 
Unemployment rate +1% (absolute) +0.11% + 1.92% 
Average wage +$1000 per year -0.56% - 9.92% 
Unmarried births + 1 % (absolute) +0.11% +2.00% 
Superfund sites Doubled +0.04% +0.78% 
Note: Variables are taken from the last column of Table 6, and elasticities are calculated for 
a state with average welfare recipiency. Absolute changes are expressed in terms of the total 
population of a state; for example, an additional 0.31 % of a state's population will enter the 
-------welfare-rolls-if-the-state-chouses-to-tnstilute. a pregnancy suosioY.Relative changes are 
expressed in terms of the current recipient population of a state; for example, the welfare rolls 
will grow by 5.54% if the state chooses to institute a pregnancy subsidy. 
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Table 4.8: Benefit Results, Two-Stage Least Squares 
PROP-RE FAM-SE PROP-SE 
Intercept 875.73** 552.99** 563.95** 
(68.18) (55.67) (115.47) 
Matching Rate 1.00** 0.06 0.14 
(0.38) (0.30) (0.45) 
Local Cost-Shifting 83.53** -34.60 -27.34 
(12.11) (18.31) (21.86) 
Local Boards 29.06** 
(6.50) 
L.C.S. *L.B. -94.67** -13.84 -9.74 
(14.55) (I 1.67) (12.33) 
D Governor -19.33** -4.59 -6.37 
(6.07) (3.41) (3.48) 
D Legislature -19.49** -2.97 -3.22 
D Gov* DLeg 31.14** 6.72 8.87* 
(7.99) (4.20) (4.55) 
Presidential D Pct. 1.14** -1.72** -1.68** 
(0.38) (0.26) (0.30) 
Political Influence 1.84** 1.21 ** 1.66** 
(0.39) (0.40) (0.50) 
Unmarried Births -0.4 I°** 0.24** 0.28* 
(0.05) (0.08) (0.14) 
Unmarried Dif -0. 15** 0.04 -0.06 
(0.02) (0.04) (0.04) 
Unemployment Rate -9.05** 1.20 1.88 
(1.61) (0.98) (1.78) 
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Welfare Families 0.0006** 
(Instrument) (0.0002) 
Recipiency Prop. 123.41 ** -8.95 
(Instrument) (13.54) (48.05) 
Per Capita Income 0.0098** 0.0136** 0.0081 
(0.0028) (0.0026) (0.0043) 
Observations 624 624 624 
Independent Var. 33 72 72 
Adjusted R-squared .78 .95 .95 
Note: The log-odds of the recipi_ency ratio (PROP) is the dependent variable in the first and 
last columns of the table. The number of welfare families (FAM) is the dependent variable 
in the middle column. 
Note: All models were estimated with yearly fixed-effects. In addition, the second and third 
columns were estimated with state fixed-effects (SE); the first column was estimated with 
regional fixed-effects (RE) but without state fixed-effects. 
* denotes significance at the . 05 level. 
** denotes significance at the .01 level. 
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Figure 4.9: State Fixed-Effects Coefficients, Both Equations 
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Table 4.10: Instrument Equations 
RECIPIENCY BENEFIT 
Intercept 593.97** -2.68** 
(127.68) (0.30) 
Matching Rate 0.15 -0.0047** 
(0.32) (0.0015) 
Local Cost-Shifting -32.51 -0.36** 
(18.49) (0.09) 
L.C.S. *Local Boards -12.77 0.08 
(11.78) (0.05) 
D Governor -7.34* -0.0033 
(3.44) (0.0175) 
D Legislature -7.11 -0.02 
(4.26) (0.02) 
D Gov* DLeg 9.01* 0.03 
(4.24) (0.02) 
Presidential D Pct.· -1.50** 0.0046** 
(0.28) (0.0011) 
Political Influence 1.30** 0.0049** 
(0.40) (0.0016) 
Unmarried Births 0.22** 0.0027** 
(0.08) (0.0004) 
Unmarried Dif -0.06 -0.0004** 
(0.03) (0.0001) 
Unemployment Rate 1.05 0.02** 
(1.04) (0.01) 
Per Capita Income 0.0097** -0.0001 ** 
(0.0023) (0.0000) 
· Pregnancy Subsidy -12.02* 0.11 ** 
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(5.30) (0.02) 
Offices Per Capita 154.23 3.75* 
(528.66) {l.71) 
Crime Index 4.05 0.01 
(2.50). (0.01) 
Hospitals Per Capita -1.10 0.0013 
(0.65) (0.0028) 
Superfund Sites -1.35 -0.0045 
(0.84) (0.0040) 
Urban Percentage 168.41 0.24 
(175.36) (0.25) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.96 0.94 
Note: The first column was used to construct the welfare benefit package instrument for the 
recipiency equation. The second column was used to construct the recipiency proportion 
instrument for the benefit equation. 
------Note;-Both-equations-were-estimated-with-yearly-and-state-fixed-effects-. ----------~ 
* denotes significance at .05 level. 
** denotes significance at .01 level. 
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